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Recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court striking the imposing of certain adult 
sentences on juveniles suggest a shift in the Court‟s traditional Eighth Amendment analysis of 
sentencing practices involving juveniles in the criminal justice system.  Relying on settled 
research outlining the developmental differences between children and adults, the Court has 
modified its longstanding Eighth Amendment jurisprudence from one that hinged primarily on the 
nature of the sentence to a doctrinal approach that places greater emphasis on the age and 
characteristics of the offender upon whom the sentence is imposed.  As the Court increasingly 
relies upon the principle that youth are different to inform its decisions involving children‟s 
constitutional rights, we suggest that the sentencing of juveniles as adults, as well as the 
conditions under which juvenile offenders are incarcerated, will face greater scrutiny.  While 
adult crime may indeed warrant adult time, the punishment of juvenile crime—whether in the 
juvenile or adult justice systems—must yield to a different set of constitutional principles.  In the 
Article that follows, we propose a distinct juvenile definition of cruel and unusual punishment that 
will produce divergent outcomes depending upon whether the litigant challenging the sentence or 
other aspects of his punishment is a juvenile or an adult. 
 
We start with a historical overview of the American juvenile justice system, showing how the 
system has been transformed over time by both internal and external influences, and how the 
current wave of constitutional reform fits within that historical context.  We then summarize the 
developmental and neuroscientific research establishing that youth are different in 
constitutionally relevant ways, to underscore how these differences and the underlying research 
are driving contemporary constitutional analysis.  This review is followed by a discussion of 
Supreme Court case law involving challenges to sentencing practices and conditions of 
confinement under the Eighth Amendment.  Finally, we summarize applicable international and 
human rights principles, as the Supreme Court has increasingly demonstrated its willingness to 
consider international law to inform its own independent judgment regarding the country‟s 
evolving, contemporary moral standards. 
INTRODUCTION: LOOKING BACKWARDS, LOOKING FORWARD 
Over 100 years ago, the first juvenile court was established in Cook County, Illinois.
1
  
The original purpose of the court was to separate juvenile offenders from adult offenders, to 
provide opportunities for rehabilitation and treatment, to create a more informal setting in which 
to adjudicate criminal conduct by children, and to limit the consequences of engaging in such 
                                                          
1 The Juvenile Court Act of 1899, 1899 Ill. Laws 131.  See also DEAN JOHN CHAMPION, THE JUVENILE 
JUSTICE SYSTEM, DELINQUENCY, PROCESSING, AND THE LAW 13 (5th ed. 1992).  Although the first Juvenile Court Act 
was passed in Illinois, many commentators credit Judge Ben Lindsey of the Denver Juvenile Court for his visionary 
approach to juvenile justice and for having the greatest influence on the development of the early juvenile court in this 
country.  See H. TED RUBIN, JUVENILE JUSTICE, POLICIES, PRACTICES AND PROGRAMS 1-1 (2003). 
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conduct.
2
  Within twenty-five years, almost every state in the country had established a juvenile 
justice system.
3
  The basic premise of the juvenile court—that youth are different from adults, and 
uniquely capable of rehabilitation—would eventually be echoed in the Court‘s current Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence, though now supported by contemporary behavioral and 
neuroscientific research in adolescent development, and with more robust procedural protections. 
The early juvenile justice system left procedural due process behind, favoring 
informality over process and the best interests of the children over consideration for their rights.
4
  
Prior to 1966, the nation‘s juvenile courts functioned with little scrutiny from outsiders—either by 
members of the public or even appellate courts.
5
  Except for two instances in which the Supreme 
Court acknowledged the particular vulnerability of youth with respect to police interrogations and 
confessions,
6
 juvenile courts for the most part operated far outside constitutional boundaries. 
In 1966, the Supreme Court decided Kent v United States.
7
  Kent involved a challenge to 
transfer proceedings under the District of Columbia‘s Juvenile Court Act.  For the first time in 
juvenile court history, the Court held that certain due process protections were required before a 
child could be removed from juvenile court jurisdiction to adult criminal court.
8
  The Kent Court 
recognized the substantial consequences of criminal court prosecution for a juvenile, from 
significantly enhanced sentencing to other collateral consequences with potentially lasting 
impact.
9
 
                                                          
2 FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 5–8 (2005); see also Catherine J. Ross, Disposition 
In A Discretionary Regime: Punishment And Rehabilitation In The Juvenile Justice System, 36 B.C. L. REV. 1037, 1038 
(1995) (explaining how discretion preserved flexibility in juvenile justice jurisprudence). 
3 Juvenile Justice History, CENTER ON JUVENILE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, http://www.cjcj.org/juvenile/ 
justice/juvenile/justice/history/0 (last visited Feb. 6, 2012).  ―In 1899, the first juvenile court was finally established in 
Cook County, Illinois, and by 1925, all but two states had followed.‖  Id.  See also HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA 
SICKMUND, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 1999 NATIONAL REPORT 86 (1999), available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/nationalreport99/chapter4.pdf (explaining that by 1925, all but two states had established 
a juvenile court). 
4 Ross, supra note 2, at 1039. 
5 Laurence Steinberg & Robert G. Schwartz, Developmental Psychology Goes to Court, in YOUTH ON 
TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 9–31 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000) 
[hereinafter YOUTH ON TRIAL]. 
6 Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962) (holding that the confession obtained from a fourteen-year-old 
boy, who had been held for five days without seeing his parents, a lawyer, or any other adult friend, was obtained in 
violation of due process); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) (holding that a murder confession by a fifteen-year-old boy 
after five hours of interrogation, starting at midnight, by police officers working in relays without advising him of his 
rights, and without the advice of friends, family or counsel, should have been excluded as involuntary in violation of due 
process).  In Gallegos, the Court observed that an adolescent ―cannot be compared with an adult in full possession of his 
senses and knowledgeable of the consequences of his admissions. . . .  Without some adult protection against this 
inequality, a 14-year-old boy would not be able to know, let alone assert, such constitutional rights as he had.‖  Gallegos, 
370 U.S. at 54. The Court also explained, ―Formulas of respect for constitutional safeguards cannot prevail over the facts 
of life which contradict them.‖  Haley, 332 U.S. at 601. 
7 383 U.S. 541 (1966). 
8 Id. at 561–62 (―[A]n opportunity for a hearing which may be informal, must be given the child prior to 
entry of a waiver order. . . . [T]he hearing must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.‖). 
9 Id. at 550 (recounting that the juvenile defendant in Kent was originally sentenced to thirty to ninety years 
in prison). 
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Kent ushered in a period of profound change for the juvenile justice system.
10
  One year 
after Kent, the Court decided In re Gault,
11
 a landmark decision setting forth the Court‘s broadest 
statement at that time about the need to protect children‘s constitutional rights.  Eschewing labels 
of civil versus criminal and rejecting the elevation of form over process, the Court was 
unequivocal in its view that courts which possess the power to strip children of their liberty, 
however benevolently intentioned, must operate within the mandates of the Due Process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.
12
  Gault was quickly followed by decisions requiring the state to 
prove delinquency charges against a juvenile on proof beyond a reasonable doubt
13
 and extending 
the protections of the double jeopardy clause to juveniles.
14
  Although the Court declined to 
extend the right to jury trial to juveniles in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,
15
 a case decided in 1971, 
the inexorable march toward a more constitutional juvenile court system was underway.
16
  
Throughout the next few years, every state amended its juvenile court act to ensure full 
compliance with the Court‘s constitutional mandates.
17
 
This constitutionalization of the juvenile court was the dominant story in juvenile justice 
until the late 1980s and early 1990s, when increases in violent juvenile crime caused by the lethal 
combination of crack cocaine and guns
18
 spread throughout the country.
19
  The prominence 
                                                          
10 Ross, supra note 2, at 1039 (―Beginning in 1966, the Supreme Court attempted to define a balance 
between the promise of the rehabilitative ideal, which appeared to demand and justify judicial discretion, and the claim for 
sufficient procedural protections under the Constitution to ensure fundamental fairness.‖). 
11 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
12 Id. at 27–29. 
13 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970). 
14 Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975). 
15 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971). 
16 Ross, supra note 2, at 1040–41. 
The juvenile courts that have resulted in most states are hybrids that reflect the series of 
compromises underlying their unique structure.  They exist in a twilight, neither wholly bound by 
the constitutional norms of criminal procedure nor convincingly ‗civil‘ and rehabilitative as 
envisioned by their founders. The post-Gault juvenile court is characterized by unresolved conflicts 
between the urge to allow judicial discretion where it serves the purposes of rehabilitation and 
demands for procedural protections; between the rehabilitative goal and societal demands for 
retribution; and between idealistic hopes and realistic disappointments. 
Id. 
17 See, e.g., The Juvenile Act, 42 PA CONST. STAT. §§ 6301–6365 (2008), available at http://www.pajuv 
defenders.org/file/Juvenile_Act_2008.pdf. 
18 ALFRED BLUMSTEIN, YOUTH, GUNS, AND VIOLENT CRIME 39, available at http://futureofchildren.org 
/futureofchildren/publications/docs/12_02_03.pdf. 
The increase in violence in the United States during the late 1980s and early 1990s was due 
primarily to an increase in violent acts committed by people under age 20.  Similarly, dramatic 
declines in homicide and robbery in recent years are attributable primarily to a decline in youth 
violence. 
The increase in youth homicide was predominantly due to a significant increase in the use of 
handguns, which converted ordinary teenage fights and other violent encounters into homicides. 
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accorded to images and stories about violent juvenile offenders sparked a new wave of juvenile 
justice ―reform,‖ one aimed at limiting the jurisdiction of juvenile court and expanding the 
jurisdiction of the adult criminal justice system over young offenders.  Convinced that the country 
was headed toward a generation of increasingly violent teens,
20
 legislators quickly enacted laws 
that sought to ensure that youth charged with the most serious offenses would be prosecuted as 
adults.
21
  As yet another period of transformation swept over the juvenile court, concerns for due 
process and the constitutional rights of juvenile offenders were almost completely eclipsed by 
concerns for public safety, incapacitation and retribution—the latter being core attributes of the 
adult criminal justice system.
22
  Whatever lingering fealty to principles of rehabilitation and 
treatment the juvenile court retained was now reserved for an increasingly dwindling number of 
juveniles charged with crimes.
23
  At the same time, youthful offenders in the criminal justice 
                                                          
Several other interrelated factors also fueled the rise in youth violence, including the rise of illegal 
drug markets, particularly for crack cocaine, the recruitment of youth into those markets, and an 
increase in gun carrying among young people. 
Id. 
19 Id. 
20 John Dilulio is largely credited with creating the ―super-predator‖ myth.  Elizabeth Becker, As Ex-
Theorist on Young „Superpredators,‟ Bush Aide Has Regrets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2001/02/09/us/as-ex-theorist-on-young-superpredators-bush-aide-has-regrets.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. 
Based on all that we have witnessed, researched and heard from people who are close to the action, . 
. . here is what we believe: America is now home to thickening ranks of juvenile ‗super-predators‘ – 
radically impulsive, brutally remorseless youngsters, including ever more pre-teenage boys, who 
murder, assault, rape, rob, burglarize, deal deadly drugs, join gun-toting gangs and create serious 
communal disorders. 
Dilulio subsequently retracted this ‗belief.‘  Id.  See also WILLIAM J. BENNETT ET AL., BODY COUNT: MORAL POVERTY 
AND HOW TO WIN AMERICA‘S WAR AGAINST CRIME AND DRUGS 27 (1996); Lara A. Bazelon, Exploding the 
Superpredator Myth:  Why Infancy is the Preadolescent‟s Best Defense in Juvenile Court, N.Y.U. L. REV. 159 (2000) 
(arguing that rejections to the infancy defense are unfounded and unsupported by empirical data). 
21 YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 5, at 13–14; see also PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., OFFICE OF JUVENILE 
JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, STATE RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME xi (1996), 
available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/statresp.pdf (reporting on the five major changes in the way that serious and 
violent juvenile offenders are being handled in the criminal justice system). 
22 Graham v Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028–30 (2010). 
23 See Paul Holland & Wallace J. Mlyniec, Whatever Happened To The Right To Treatment?: The Modern 
Quest For A Historical Promise, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1791, 1794 (1995). 
While some of the most egregious abuses described in the pleadings and opinions of the 1970s have 
abated, many training schools remain ill-equipped to provide children living in them with the 
education, behavior modification, counseling, substance abuse treatment, and the mental and 
physical health care they need.  The laws of most states still promise such care.  In recent years, 
however, a wave of legislation increasing the severity with which children who break the law are 
treated has compromised that promise.  Legislatures have introduced punishment into juvenile 
codes, authorized mandatory minimum commitments in the juvenile justice system, and expanded 
the possibilities for prosecuting children in criminal courts.  Some juvenile courts now have the 
power to impose a criminal sentence as part of a juvenile disposition, with the criminal sentence 
stayed—either temporarily or permanently—depending upon the youth‘s performance during the 
course of the juvenile disposition. 
Id. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012
LEVICK_FORMATTED[1].DOCX  (DO NOT DELETE) 4/30/2012 5:33 PM 
290 UNIV. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE [Vol. 15 
system bore the full brunt of adult punishment, receiving not only lengthy term of years 
sentences, but sentences of life without parole and even death.
24
 
As a result of this adultification of juvenile offending in the public discourse and, 
increasingly, in state legislation, researchers associated with the MacArthur Foundation‘s 
Research Network on Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice began conducting studies and 
compiling research that demonstrated striking and highly relevant differences between children 
and adolescents on the one hand, and adults on the other.
25
  In particular, this research highlighted 
key traits among juveniles that illustrated their reduced blameworthiness for their criminal 
conduct.
26
  Specifically, researchers focused on three distinct qualities of adolescence—
immaturity of judgment, susceptibility to negative peer pressure, and a capacity for change and 
rehabilitation based on the inherently transient nature of adolescence.
27
  In 2005, this research 
took center stage before the United States Supreme Court when it was asked to review the 
constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty in Roper v. Simmons.
28
 
Importantly, the notion that certain offenders might be less blameworthy for their 
criminal conduct had already found traction with the Court in 2003, when the Court reconsidered 
its prior caselaw upholding the death penalty for mentally retarded offenders.  In Atkins v. 
Virginia,
29
 the Court overruled Penry v. Lynaugh
30
 and held that mentally retarded defendants 
were categorically less blameworthy for their criminal conduct, including murder, than 
unimpaired adult offenders.
31
  They were thus ineligible for the death penalty.
32
  Roper followed 
Atkins‘ blueprint in persuading the Court that all juveniles under the age of eighteen were likewise 
categorically less blameworthy than adults, and could not receive the most serious sentence 
                                                          
24 At the time of the Supreme Court‘s decision in Roper v Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), in which the 
Court struck the juvenile death penalty under the Eighth Amendment, seventy-two children were being held on death row 
in the United States.  Also, nineteen states allowed executions of people under age eighteen: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, 
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, 
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah, Texas and Virginia.  Roper, 543 U.S. at 564. 
25 The MacArthur Foundation formally convened the Research Network in 1995.  YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra 
note 5, at 3–4.  The Foundation saw a need for ―a scientific initiative that would address the implications of adolescent 
development for the construction of rational juvenile justice policy and law.‖  Id. at 4.  Led by distinguished Temple 
University Psychology Professor Laurence Steinberg, the Research Network brought a developmental lens to issues such 
as competence to stand trial, culpability, and the impact of different interventions.  Id. at 4–5. 
26 See generally YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 5. 
27 See generally Thomas Grisso et al., Juveniles‟ Competence to Stand Trial: A Comparison of Adolescents 
and Adults‟ Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 333 (2003)  (studying whether youths can pass the 
standard competency tests used in the criminal justice system); Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, Maturity of 
Judgment in Adolescence: Psychosocial Factors in Adolescent Decision Making, 20 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 249 (1996) 
(analyzing research to explore what constitutes psychosocial maturity); Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Scott, Less Guilty 
by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014 (2003) [hereinafter Steinberg & Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence] (explaining 
that the lack of psychosocial maturity in juveniles makes them especially vulnerable to coercion and outside influences); 
Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making in Legal Contexts, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 221 (1995) 
(explaining factors linked to teenage development that may affect decision making capabilities in adolescents). 
28 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
29 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
30 492 U.S. 302 (1989). 
31 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318–20. 
32 Id. at 321. 
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available—a sentence of death reserved for the worst of the worst criminals.
33
  The Court 
embraced the developmental research articulating the differences between juvenile and adult 
offenders,
34
 and reversed its prior 1989 decision in Stanford v Kentucky
35
 which had left the death 
penalty in place for sixteen- and seventeen-year-old juvenile offenders.
36
 
Five years later, the Court was presented with another opportunity to consider the 
constitutional relevance of juvenile developmental traits in Graham v. Florida,
37
 where petitioner 
challenged the constitutionality of a life without parole sentence for a juvenile convicted of a non-
homicide offense.  The Graham court echoed Roper in its reliance on developmental research as 
well as emerging neuroscientific research to ban the imposition of this adult sentence on juvenile 
offenders as violative of the Eighth Amendment.  The Court reiterated its findings about the 
developmental characteristics of youth cited in Roper in support of its decision.
38
  One year later, 
in J.D.B. v. North Carolina,
39
  the Court extended the application of this research beyond 
sentencing cases, citing it once again to hold that a juvenile‘s age is a relevant factor in the 
Miranda custody analysis.
40
  In a span of just six years, the Court handed down three decisions 
                                                          
33 Roper, 543 U.S. at 568–70. 
34 Id. at 569–70.  See generally ERIK H. ERIKSON, IDENTITY:  YOUTH AND CRISIS (1968) (describing and 
defining the notion of an identity crisis within the context of youth identities); Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in 
Adolescence:  A Developmental Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 339 (1992) (explaining the underlying factors 
behind reckless behavior in adolescents); Steinberg & Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence, supra note 27, at 1013 
(exploring the research and theories behind concerns raised by the criminal culpability of children). 
35 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). 
36 Id.  One year prior to Stanford, the Court handed down Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 818–38 
(1988), in which a plurality (including Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun) determined 
that ―standards of decency‖ did not permit the execution of an individual who commits a crime while under the age of 
sixteen.  Id. at 830. 
37 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
38 Id. at 2026 (―No recent data provide reason to reconsider the Court‘s observations in Roper about the 
nature of juveniles.‖). 
39 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).  In J.D.B. v North Carolina, the Court had the opportunity to review its concerns 
underlying its decision in Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), in the context of the interrogation of a thirteen-year-
old middle school student who was questioned in a closed-door school conference room by members of law enforcement 
and school administrators.  Id. at 2399. In J.D.B., the Supreme Court ruled that a child‘s age was relevant to determining 
when a suspect has been taken into custody and is consequently entitled to a Miranda warning.  Id. at 2046.  Writing for 
the majority, Justice Sotomayor stated, ―so long as the child‘s age was known to the officer at the time of police 
questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, its inclusion in the custody analysis is 
consistent with the objective nature of that test.‖  Id.  Justice Sotomayor effectively characterized youth as an 
unambiguous fact that ―generates commonsense conclusions about behavior and perception,‖ id. at 2403, and said that 
such ―conclusions‖ are ―self-evident to anyone who was once a child himself, including any police officer or judge.‖  Id. 
40 Id. at 2406.  Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79 (1966), is the Supreme Court‘s seminal decision 
adopting a set of prophylactic warnings to be given to suspects prior to custodial interrogation by law enforcement.  
Specifically, the Miranda Court instructed that, prior to questioning, a suspect ―must be warned that he has a right to 
remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has the right to the 
presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.‖  Id.  The Miranda warnings were adopted to protect the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination from the ―inherently compelling pressures‖ of questioning by the police.  
Id. at 467.  While any police interview has ―coercive aspects to it,‖ Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per 
curiam), interviews which take place in police custody have a ―heighte[ned] risk‘ that statements are not the product of the 
suspect‘s free choice.‖  J.D.B. v North Carolina, 131 S. Ct 2394, 2401 (2011) (citing Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 
428, 435 (2000)).  Miranda expressly recognized that custodial interrogation in an ―unfamiliar . . . police dominated 
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that have re-shaped our thinking about the rights of juvenile offenders under the Constitution.
41
 
At the same time, the Court‘s decisions in Roper, Graham, and J.D.B. are juxtaposed 
with a largely contrary legislative mood that has persisted in treating juvenile offenders like 
adults.
42
  Just as legislatures nationwide were embracing the now debunked premise that juvenile 
crime was synonymous with adult crime and should be punished accordingly,
43
 the Supreme 
Court placed its own constitutional breaks on this trend.  In Roper, Graham, and J.D.B., the Court 
made an abrupt turn, forcing a reexamination of juvenile and criminal justice policy and practices. 
Through these cases, the Court has articulated a distinct view of children‘s legal status 
that heralds a novel Eighth Amendment jurisprudence for children.  The Eighth Amendment has 
itself historically bent to ―evolving standards of decency‖ as reflected in both objective indicia of 
those standards and the Court‘s own subjective analysis.
44
  It now appears clear that the Court is 
taking cognizance of society‘s own evolving and disparate views of children and adults to break 
the Eighth Amendment into two strands: there will be different answers to the question of what 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment depending on the age and characteristics of the litigant 
asking the question.  We submit that this doctrinal development signals yet another period of 
reform in how we manage and treat juvenile offenders, suggesting a return to the early Twentieth 
Century view that kids are different—a view now fully backed by scientific research—while 
retaining the constitutional protection that children have had since Kent and Gault. 
                                                          
atmosphere,‖ Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445, creates psychological pressures ―which work to undermine the individual‘s will to 
resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.‖  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. 
41 In its October 2011 Term, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in two cases challenging the imposition of 
a sentence of life without parole on juvenile offenders convicted of homicide offenses.  Jackson v. Hobbs, 132 S. Ct. 548 
(2011) (No. 10-9647); Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011) (No. 10-9646).  Both Jackson and Miller were fourteen-
years-old at the time of their offenses.  Jackson v. Norris, No. 09-145, 2011 WL 478600, at *7 (Ark. 2011) (Danielson, J., 
dissenting); Miller v. State, 63 So. 3d 676, 682–83 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010).  Jackson, whose case arose in Arkansas, was 
convicted of felony murder following the killing of a video store clerk by one of Jackson‘s co-defendants during the 
course of an attempted robbery.  Jackson v. State, 359 Ark. 87, 89 (Ark. 2004).  Miller, whose case arose in Alabama, was 
convicted of first degree murder.  Miller, 63 So. 3d at 682.  Both boys received mandatory life without parole sentences 
upon conviction under the applicable state laws, and the Alabama and Arkansas appellate courts rejected Petitioners‘ 
challenges to their sentences under the Eighth Amendment.  See Miller v. State, 63 So. 3d 676 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010); 
Jackson v. Norris, No. 09-145, 2011 WL 478600 (Ark. 2011).  In their challenges before the U.S. Supreme Court, 
Petitioners argue that the sentences are prohibited under Graham v. Florida.  See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Jackson v. 
Norris, 2011 Ark. 49 (Ark. 2011) (No. 10-9647), 2011 WL 5322575; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Miller v. Alabama, 63 
So. 3d 676 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010) (No. 10-9646), 2011 WL 5322568.  In addition to challenging the sentences outright, 
Petitioners also assert that their young age at the time of the offense, as well as the mandatory nature of the sentence, 
compounds the constitutional infirmity of the sentence.  See id.  The cases will be argued in March 2012; a decision is 
expected by the end of the Court‘s term.  Supreme Court of the United States October 2011 Term, SUPREME COURT OF 
THE UNITED STATES (last updated Feb. 12, 2012), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_calendars 
/MonthlyArgumentViewer.aspx?Filename=MonthlyArgumentCalMar2012.html. 
42 See TORBET ET AL., supra note 21, at xv (demonstrating that state legislatures toughened laws ―targeting 
serious and violent juvenile offenders‖). 
43 See BENNETT ET AL., supra note 20, at 27 (arguing that youth labeled ―superpredators‖ are capable of 
equally heinous crimes as adults). 
44 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–101 (1958). 
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I. DEVELOPMENTAL IMMATURITY: RESEARCH ON ADOLESCENT 
DEVELOPMENT 
Researchers in the field of developmental psychology use the concept of ―developmental 
immaturity‖ to describe an adolescent‘s still-developing neurological, cognitive, behavioral, 
emotional, and social capacity.
45
  Emerging research in this area indicates that developmental 
immaturity consists of four components distinguishing adolescents from adults: independent 
functioning, decision-making, emotion regulation, and general cognitive processing.
46
 
Research documenting the differences between juveniles and adults suggests that 
developmental immaturity may necessitate different treatment of adolescents under the Eighth 
Amendment.  Using the construct of developmental immaturity as a guide, the discussion that 
follows reviews four areas of functioning most relevant to our understanding of the application of 
the Eighth Amendment to adolescent sentencing and conditions: decision-making, impulsivity, 
vulnerability, and the transitory nature of adolescence. 
A. Decision-Making 
Broadly, decision-making refers to the various cognitive, emotional, and social factors 
that influence how individuals process information and arrive at conclusions.  Some core 
components involved in decision-making include the capacity to consider future consequences, 
weigh costs and benefits, and recognize risks.
47
  As the evidence research below demonstrates, 
juveniles are less capable of making developmentally mature decisions than adults. 
Recent research on adolescent decision-making suggests that youth are heavily 
influenced by social and emotional factors.
48
  Adolescents are overwhelmingly more likely than 
adults to engage in risky behavior despite a similar ability to appraise risk.  This can be explained, 
in part, through the psychosocial factors that are likely to influence decision-making, particularly 
among adolescents: 1) responsibility, which refers to acting independently and having a clear 
understanding of one‘s self; 2) perspective, which involves understanding multiple viewpoints of 
a situation; and 3) temperance, which is the ability to modulate impulsive thoughts and 
behaviors.
49
  Empirical research on these factors reveals that psychosocial maturity continues to 
develop into early adulthood.
50
  Thus, the evidence suggests that adolescents have pronounced 
deficits in areas that can influence how they act in high-risk or criminal contexts. 
Adolescents‘ decision-making is also likely to be influenced by affective, or emotional, 
factors.  Research has identified three different ways in which emotions can shape the decision-
making process: 1) anticipated emotional outcomes; 2) anticipatory emotions; and 3) incidental 
                                                          
45 See generally Kathleen Kemp et al., Characteristics of Developmental Immaturity: A Cross-Disciplinary 
Survey of Psychologists (Aug. 2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Drexel University) (on file with Hagerty Library, 
Drexel University) (arguing that developmental immature contains the above characteristics). 
46 Id. at viii. 
47 Id. at 16. 
48 See Dustin Albert & Laurence Steinberg, Judgment and Decision Making in Adolescence, 21 J. RES. ON 
ADOLESCENCE 211, 217 (2011) (explaining that ―socioemotional stimuli‖ has an impact on adolescent decision-making). 
49 Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, (Im)maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: Why Adolescents 
May Be Less Culpable Than Adults, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 741, 744–745 (2000). 
50 Id. at 752–53. 
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emotions.
51
  First, individuals may choose to perform particular behaviors in a given situation by 
evaluating the anticipated emotional outcomes of various behavioral options.  Behaviors that 
seem likely to increase positive emotions tend to become more desirable, even if they carry with 
them a degree of risk.
52
  Second, individuals‘ direct emotional responses to various behaviors also 
may guide their decision-making.
53
  For instance, individuals tend to approach behavioral 
situations to which they have positive emotional responses and avoid those situations that evoke 
negative emotions.  Finally, incidental, or background, emotions can influence judgments about 
the risk or desirability of certain behavioral options.
54
  Because adolescence is a period of 
emotional instability, these emotional influences are particularly salient in adolescents‘ decision-
making.
55
 
Moreover, adolescent decision-making is characterized by sensation- and reward-seeking 
behavior,
56
 which tends to intensify from childhood to adolescence before declining from late 
adolescence through the mid-20s.
57
  This curvilinear trend in reward-seeking—peaking in 
adolescence before declining—may be partially based on adolescents‘ differing sensitivity to 
reward and punishment.  Recent research suggests that while sensitivity to punishment develops 
in a linear manner (steadily increasing throughout adolescence), reward sensitivity follows a 
curvilinear, developmental path that parallels the reward-seeking pattern—peaking in adolescence 
before declining in adulthood.
58
 
In sum, empirical research has revealed that juveniles have different decision-making 
abilities than adults in that they are less able to engage in psychosocially mature evaluations of 
situations and consequences of their decisions, and that they simultaneously have an increased 
sensitivity to the affective and reward components of behavior.  This research suggests that, as a 
group, juveniles are less responsible and, therefore, may be less culpable for their decisions than 
adults.  Although each juvenile develops at his or her own rate, and may respond uniquely to 
different contexts, these differences in decision-making processes broadly distinguish the 
functioning of adolescents, as a class, from that of adults. 
B. Impulsivity 
Impulsivity has been defined as ―a predisposition toward rapid, unplanned reactions to 
internal or external stimuli without regard to the negative consequences of these reactions to the 
impulsive individuals or others.‖
59
  As mentioned above, one psychosocial factor likely to 
influence behavior is temperance, or the ability to regulate one‘s behavior and evaluate a situation 
                                                          
51 See Albert & Steinberg, supra note 48, at 216-17 (defining anticipated emotional outcomes, anticipatory 
emotions, and incidental emotions). 
52 Id. at 217. 
53 Id. at 217. 
54 Id. 
55 Steinberg & Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence, supra note 27, at 1013. 
56 Laurence Steinberg, A Dual Systems Model of Adolescent Risk-Taking, 52 DEVELOPMENTAL 
PSYCHOBIOLOGY 216, 217 (2010). 
57 Id. at 219–20. 
58 Elizabeth Cauffman et al., Age Differences in Affective Decision Making as Indexed by Performance on 
the Iowa Gambling Task, 46 DEV. PSYCHOL. 193, 193 (2010). 
59 Matthew S. Stanford et al., Fifty Years of the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale: An Update and Review, 47 
PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 385, 385 (2009). 
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before one acts.
60
  In other words, impulsivity can be thought of as actions in the absence of 
formal decision-making.  Because ―impulsivity‖ describes behaviors with minimal or complete 
lack of forethought, it merits consideration in discussions of culpability. 
Adolescents‘ tendencies to act impulsively are well documented in the psychological 
literature.  Recent research demonstrates that impulsivity declines steadily throughout 
adolescence and early adulthood, with appreciable declines evident into the mid-twenties.
61
  
Greater levels of impulsivity during adolescence may be based on adolescents‘ weak future 
orientation and disinclination to consider or anticipate the consequences of decisions.
62
  The 
tendency to choose small immediate rewards over larger delayed rewards declines steadily 
throughout adolescence.
63
  Research also demonstrates significant age differences in planning 
ahead (e.g., adolescents are more likely to think that planning ahead is a ―waste of time‖); time 
perspective (e.g., adolescents are more likely to report that they ―would rather be happy today 
than take their chances on what might happen in the future‖); and anticipation of future 
consequences (e.g., adolescents are more likely to report that they ―don‘t think it‘s necessary to 
think about every little possibility before making a decision‖).
64
  This focus on immediate benefits 
contributes to the high rates of impulsivity among adolescents that distinguishes adolescent and 
adult culpability. 
C. Vulnerability 
Immaturity in independent functioning, decision-making, and emotional regulation can 
make adolescents particularly susceptible to risky decision-making, peer influence and adult 
coercion, and greater sensitivity to invasions of privacy.  Consequently, in many legal contexts, 
adolescents are recognized as a vulnerable population.
65
 
Adolescent vulnerability is well-documented in developmental research.  First, research 
suggests that adolescents demonstrate lower levels of independent functioning, as manifested in 
their poor self-reliance and weak self-concept.
66
  Poor self-reliance is evidenced in adolescents‘ 
difficulty demonstrating independence from peers and authority figures and their concomitant 
need for social validation.  Weak self-concept can be seen in adolescents‘ difficulty recognizing 
personal strengths and weaknesses and developing individual values.
67
  This murky sense of self 
can heighten adolescents‘ vulnerability through their reliance on others (either peers or adults) to 
                                                          
60 Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 49, at 745. 
61 Steinberg, supra note 56, at 220–21. 
62 Laurence Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Future Orientation and Delay Discounting, 80 CHILD. DEV. 
28, 29–30 (2009). 
63 Id. at 28, 36. 
64 Id. at 34–35. 
65 See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S.  Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010) (abolishing life without parole for juveniles 
convicted of non-homicide offenses); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (abolishing the death penalty for 
juvenile offenders); Richard E. Redding, Children‟s Competence to Provide Informed Consent for Mental Health 
Treatment, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 695, 697  (1993) (noting the traditional view that children cannot consent to 
treatment); Naomi E. Sevin Goldstein et al., Juvenile Offenders‟ Miranda Rights Comprehension and Self-Reported 
Likelihood of Offering False Confessions, 10 ASSESSMENT 359, 359 (2003) (discussing juveniles‘ Miranda 
comprehension deficits and vulnerability during interrogations). 
66 Kemp et al., supra note 45, at 16. 
67 Id. at 16. 
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guide their decision-making and behavior. 
This compromised independent functioning can make adolescents particularly vulnerable 
to peer pressure and compliance with authority.  According to Steinberg and Scott, ―Peer 
influence affects adolescent judgment both directly and indirectly.  In some contexts, adolescents 
make choices in response to direct peer pressure to act in certain ways.  More indirectly, 
adolescents‘ desire for peer approval—and fear of rejection—affect their choices, even without 
direct coercion.‖
68
  Early research on direct peer pressure suggests that adolescents‘ tendency to 
choose an antisocial activity suggested by their peers over a prosocial activity of their own 
choosing peaks in early- to mid-adolescence and declines slowly into adulthood.
69
  Adolescents 
are far more likely to take risks in the presence of peers, including instances without direct 
pressure or coercion.  For example, in one study, adolescents took twice as many risks on a 
driving task when peers were present than when they were alone, running yellow lights at the risk 
of being hit by an unseen car.
70
 
Also, youth tend to yield to the demands of authority figures,
71
 complying with adults 
based on a blanket acceptance of their authority, rather than as a result of the youths‘ reasoning 
about an adult‘s request.
72
  Thus, adolescents‘ decision-making skills can be further compromised 
when confronted with a demand or request by an authority figure. 
In addition to cognitive characteristics that differentiate adolescents‘ functioning from 
that of adults, developmental immaturity is characterized by differences in the ability to regulate 
emotions.  Adolescents tend to demonstrate difficulties recognizing and expressing feelings, 
managing their emotions, and coping with undesirable feelings.
73
  This places adolescents at a 
disadvantage in high stress situations, and consistent or chronic exposure to stressful stimuli can, 
in turn, reduce adolescents‘ opportunities to develop successful emotional regulation abilities.
74
  
Factors such as childhood maltreatment,
75
 maternal depression,
76
 exposure to violence,
77
 and 
economic deprivation
78
 are associated with poor emotion regulation (i.e., emotion 
―dysregulation‖) in children and adolescents.  Empirical evidence also has shown that adolescents 
with poor emotion regulation often demonstrate both internalizing (e.g., depression and anxiety) 
                                                          
68 Steinberg & Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence, supra note 27, at 1012. 
69 Thomas J. Berndt, Developmental Changes in Conformity to Peers and Parents, 15 DEV. PSYCHOL. 608, 
615 (1979). 
70 Margo Gardner & Laurence Steinberg, Peer Influence on Risk Taking, Risk Preference, and Risky 
Decision Making in Adolescence and Adulthood: An Experimental Study, 41 DEV. PSYCHOL. 625, 629–30 (2005). 
71 Lila Ghent Braine et al., Conflicts with Authority: Children‟s Feelings, Actions, and Justifications, 27 
DEV. PSYCHOL. 829, 834 (1991). 
72 Id. at 835. 
73 Kemp et al., supra note 45, at 28. 
74 Liliana J. Lengua, The Contribution of Emotionality and Self-Regulation to the Understanding of 
Children‟s Response to Multiple Risk, 73 CHILD DEV. 144, 156 (2002). 
75 Angeline Maughan & Dante Cicchetti, Impact of Child Maltreatment and Interadult Violence on 
Children‟s Emotion Regulation Abilities and Socioemotional Adjustment, 73 CHILD DEV. 1525, 1534 (2002). 
76 Angeline Maughan et al., Early-occurring Maternal Depression and Maternal Negativity in Predicting 
Young Children‟s Emotion Regulation and Socioemotional Difficulties, 35 J. ABNORMAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 685, 695 
(2007). 
77 Maughan & Cicchetti, supra note 75, at 1534–35. 
78 Id. at 1540. 
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and externalizing (e.g., aggressive behaviors) symptoms,
79
 and rates of these symptoms and 
associated mental health diagnoses are elevated among youth involved in the justice system.
80
 
Compared with adults, juveniles are particularly vulnerable to the influence and 
manipulation of others.  Youths‘ underdeveloped sense of personal identity and independence, 
coupled with their compromised decision-making abilities, place them at-risk for susceptibility to 
direct and indirect coercion by peers and authority figures.  Furthermore, juveniles have trouble 
regulating their emotions and have a heightened sensitivity to invasions of privacy—particularly 
when they have experienced economic or social disadvantages.  Together, these findings suggest 
that juveniles, as a class, have unique needs for protection and guidance that are greater than and 
different from the needs of adults. 
D. Transitory Nature of Adolescence 
Adolescence is inherently transitory; this period ultimately ends as do the deficits that are 
uniquely associated with developmental immaturity.  As researchers Scott and Steinberg have 
explained, ―The period is transitional because it is marked by rapid and dramatic change within 
the individual in the realms of biology, cognition, emotion, and interpersonal relationships. . . . 
Even the word ‗adolescence‘ has origins that connote its transitional nature: it derives from the 
Latin verb adolescere, to grow into adulthood.‖
81
 
As much of the research outlined above reveals, different components of developmental 
immaturity either peak in adolescence and then decline into early adulthood (e.g., reward-
seeking), or steadily decline throughout childhood and adolescence (e.g., impulsivity).
82
  In sum, 
as youth grow, so do their self-management skills and ability for long-term planning, judgment 
and decision-making, regulation of emotion, and evaluation of risk and reward.
83
  Thus, many of 
the factors associated with antisocial, risky, or criminal behavior lose their intensity as individuals 
become more developmentally mature. 
There is also empirical evidence directly relating the transitory nature of adolescence to 
delinquent and criminal behavior.  The distinction between individuals who offend only during 
adolescence and those who persist in offending into adulthood is well established in the 
psychological literature.
84
  One researcher estimated that ―chronic‖ juvenile offenders (i.e., those 
with five or more arrests) account for only about six percent of the juvenile offender population.
85
  
A more recent study followed over one thousand serious male adolescent offenders (i.e., those 
who had committed felony offenses with the exception of less serious property crimes and 
misdemeanor weapons or sexual assault offenses) over the course of three years and revealed that 
                                                          
79 Jungmeen Kim & Dante Cicchetti, Longitudinal Pathways Linking Child Maltreatment, Emotion 
Regulation, Peer Relations, and Psychopathology, 51 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 706, 712–13 (2010). 
80 See Naomi E. Sevin Goldstein et al., Mental Health Disorders: The Neglected Risk Factor in Juvenile 
Delinquency, in JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: PREVENTION, ASSESSMENT AND INTERVENTION 85, 85 (Kirk Heilbrun, Naomi 
E. Sevin Goldstein, & Richard E. Redding eds., 2005). 
81 ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 31 (2008). 
82 See, e.g., Steinberg, supra note 56, at 220–21. 
83 Steinberg & Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence, supra note 27, at 1011. 
84 Terrie E. Moffitt, Adolescence-Limited and Life-Course-Persistent Antisocial Behavior: A Developmental 
Taxonomy, 100 PSYCHOL. REV. 674, 675 (1993). 
85 Peter W. Greenwood, Responding to Juvenile Crime: Lessons Learned, 6 FUTURE OF CHILD. 75, 77–78 
(1996). 
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only 8.7% of participants were found to be ―persisters‖ in that their offending remained constant 
throughout the thirty-six-month period.
86
  The vast majority of youth who engage in delinquent 
acts desist, and ―the typical delinquent youth does not grow up to become an adult criminal.‖
87
  In 
other words, not only are youth developmentally capable of change, research also demonstrates 
that, when given a chance, even youth with histories of violent crime can and do become 
productive and law abiding citizens, without any intervention. 
Although the mere process of physiological and psychological growth will rehabilitate 
most adolescents, more than fifteen years of research on interventions for juvenile offenders has 
yielded rich data on the effectiveness of programs to reduce recidivism and cut costs, 
underscoring rehabilitation as a realistic goal for the overwhelming majority of juvenile offenders, 
including violent and repeat offenders.  Examples of programs shown to be effective with violent 
and aggressive youth include Functional Family Therapy (FFT), Multidimensional Therapeutic 
Foster Care (MTFC), and Multi-Systemic Therapy (MST).
88
  All three have been shown to reduce 
recidivism rates significantly, even for serious violent offenders.
89
  Thus, many juvenile offenders 
have the potential to achieve rehabilitation and become productive citizens. 
E. Neurological Differences Between Youth and Adults 
Recent research using advances in neuro-imaging has revealed that many of the 
components of developmental immaturity, reviewed above, have a neurological basis.  First, 
brain-imaging research has revealed that the brain‘s frontal lobes are structurally immature into 
late adolescence, making them one of the last parts of the brain to fully develop.
90
  Because the 
frontal lobes are primarily responsible for executive functions, their structural immaturity during 
much of adolescence is partially responsible for youths‘ deficits in response inhibition, planning 
ahead, and weighing risks and rewards.
91
  Not only is this area of the brain underdeveloped in 
adolescence, research has shown that this area is less active in adolescents than it is in adults.
92
  
                                                          
86 Edward P. Mulvey et al., Trajectories of Desistance and Continuity in Antisocial Behavior Following 
Court Adjudication Among Serious Adolescent Offenders, 22 DEV. PSYCHOL. 453, 462 (2010). 
87 Steinberg & Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence, supra note 27, at 1015. 
88 See PETER W. GREENWOOD, CHANGING LIVES: DELINQUENCY PREVENTION AS CRIME-CONTROL POLICY 
70 (2006). 
89 See Charles M. Borduin et al., Multisystemic Treatment of Serious Juvenile Offenders: Long-Term 
Prevention of Criminality and Violence, 63 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 569, 573 (1995) (describing the 
effectiveness of MST in reducing recidivism rates even for serious offenders with histories of repeat felonies); J. Mark 
Eddy et al., The Prevention of Violent Behavior by Chronic and Serious Male Juvenile Offenders: A 2-Year Follow-up of a 
Randomized Clinical Trial, 12 J. EMOTIONAL & BEHAV. DISORDERS 2, 2–7 (2004) (describing reduced recidivism rates 
for violent and chronically offending youth who participated in MTFC); W. Jeff Hinton et al., Juvenile Justice: A System 
Divided, 18 CRIM. JUST. POL‘Y REV. 466, 475 (2007) (describing FFT‘s success with drug-abusing youth, violent youth, 
and serious juvenile offenders); Carol M. Schaeffer & Charles M. Borduin, Long-Term Follow-Up to a Randomized 
Clinical Trial of Multisystemic Therapy With Serious and Violent Juvenile Offenders, 73 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL 
PSYCHOL. 445, 449–452 (2005) (finding that the benefits of MST often extend into adulthood). 
90 See Abigail A. Baird et al., Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging of Facial Affect Recognition in 
Children and Adolescents, 38 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 195, 197 (1999); Nitin Gogtay et al., 
Dynamic Mapping of Human Cortical Development During Childhood Through Early Adulthood, 101 PROCEEDINGS 
NAT‘L ACAD. SCI. 8174, 8174 (2004). 
91 Steinberg, supra note 56, at 217. 
92 K. Rubia et al., Functional Frontalisation with Age: Mapping Neurodevelopmental Trajectories with 
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And, as adolescents move into early adulthood, increasing amounts of brain activity shift to the 
frontal lobes.
93
  Researchers understand these patterns to be linked to the steady decline of 
impulsivity throughout adolescence and into adulthood.
94
  That is, decreased levels of impulsivity 
seem to coincide with increased levels of frontal lobe maturity. 
Second, the limbic system changes during puberty and is particularly active in adolescent 
brains.
95
  The limbic system is generally regarded as the socio-emotional center of the brain, and, 
therefore, its changes and activity level during this time are particularly relevant to the discussion 
of adolescent decision-making.
96
  Far from acting in isolation, adolescents‘ underdeveloped 
frontal lobes and highly active and changing limbic systems interact.  Therefore, while 
adolescents are still maturing, the frontal lobes are less able to exert control over behavior and 
emotions, making adolescents even more vulnerable to social and emotional cues in decision-
making.
97
 
Finally, the dopaminergic system, the system involved in the transmission of the 
chemical dopamine which plays an important role in processing rewards, is restructured during 
adolescence.
98
  The dopaminergic system‘s connections to the limbic system and frontal lobes 
increase during mid- and late-adolescence and then decline.
99
  These changes may lead to the 
increase in reward-seeking behavior and heightened responsiveness to rewards observed among 
adolescents. 
Youths‘ developmental immaturity leads them to function differently than adults in 
independent functioning, decision-making, emotion regulation, and general cognitive processing.  
These differences have been observed in behavioral studies as well as studies documenting the 
neurological changes that take place during adolescence and early adulthood.  Adolescents‘ 
resulting deficits in certain areas, such as decision-making and impulsivity, along with their 
heightened vulnerability and the inherently transitory nature of adolescence, suggest that they 
should be treated differently under the Eighth Amendment. 
II. GRAHAM V. FLORIDA AND ROPER V. SIMMONS: THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT EMBEDS ITS EIGHTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS OF 
JUVENILE SENTENCES IN RESEARCH 
On May 17, 2010, in Graham v. Florida,
100
 the United States Supreme Court ruled that 
sentences of life without the possibility of parole imposed on juveniles convicted of non-homicide 
offenses violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment.
101
  In an 
opinion written by Justice Kennedy, the Court held that such a severe and irrevocable punishment 
                                                          
fMRI, 24 NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAV. REVS. 13, 18 (2000). 
93 Id. 
94 Steinberg, supra note 56, at 217. 
95 Rubia, supra note 92, at 18. 
96 Albert & Steinberg, supra note 48, at 217. 
97 Id. at 219. 
98 See Steinberg, supra note 56, at 217. 
99 Id. 
100 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
101 Id. at 2034. 
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was not appropriate for a less culpable juvenile offender.
102
  In banning the sentence, Justice 
Kennedy underscored that case law, developmental research, and neuroscience all recognize that 
children are different from adults—they are less culpable for their actions and at the same time 
have a greater capacity to change and mature.
103
  Justice Kennedy‘s opinion was rooted in the 
Court‘s earlier analysis in Roper v. Simmons,
104
 which had held the death penalty unconstitutional 
as applied to juveniles.  The Graham Court echoed the reasoning in Roper that three essential 
characteristics distinguish youth from adults for culpability purposes: youth lack maturity and 
responsibility; they are vulnerable and susceptible to peer pressure; and their characters are 
unformed.
105
  Justice Kennedy reasoned: 
No recent data provide reason to reconsider the Court‘s observations in Roper 
about the nature of juveniles.  As petitioner‘s amici point out, developments in 
psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences 
between juvenile and adult minds.  For example, parts of the brain involved in 
behavior control continue to mature through late adolescence.  Juveniles are 
more capable of change than are adults, and their actions are less likely to be 
evidence of ‗irretrievably depraved character‘ than are the actions of adults.
106
 
The majority made clear in Graham and Roper that the constitutionality of a particular 
punishment for juveniles (i.e., whether it is cruel and unusual) is directly tied to prevailing 
research on adolescent development, and that juvenile status is central to the constitutional 
analysis. 
A. A New Look at Juvenile Sentencing 
Together, Graham and Roper provide the framework for a novel, developmentally driven 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence that should force a more rigorous examination of permissible 
sentencing options for juvenile offenders in the criminal justice system.
107
  In Graham, the Court 
                                                          
102 Id. at 2027–28. 
103 Id. at 2026. 
104 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
105 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70). 
106 Id. (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 570) (internal citations omitted). 
107 These decisions should also be read against the backdrop of a series of Supreme Court decisions over the 
last several decades in which the Court has repeatedly accorded children and youth distinct treatment under the 
Constitution.  While the Court‘s consideration of juvenile status is particularly pronounced in cases involving children in 
the juvenile and criminal justice systems, the characteristics of youth have also led to a specialized jurisprudence under the 
First and Fourth Amendments, as well as the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.  See, e.g., 
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2404 (2011) (determining that age of juvenile is relevant to a Miranda v. 
Arizona custody analysis under the Fourth Amendment).  In civil cases, as well, the Supreme Court has frequently 
expressed its view that children are different from adults, and has tailored its constitutional analysis accordingly.  
Reasoning that ―during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack . . . experience, perspective, 
and judgment,‖ Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979), the Court has upheld greater state restrictions on minors‘ 
exercise of reproductive choice.  Id.  See also Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 444 (1990); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for 
Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 520 (1990).  The Court has also held that different obscenity standards apply to children 
than to adults under the First Amendment in Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637 (1968), and has concluded that the 
state has a compelling interest in protecting children from images that are ―harmful to minors.‖  Denver Area Educ. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol15/iss3/1
LEVICK_FORMATTED[1].DOCX  (DO NOT DELETE) 4/30/2012 5:33 PM 
2012] THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT EVOLVES 301 
held that an indefinite sentence was inherently at odds with the transient nature of adolescence.  
Justice Kennedy explained: 
The Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a 
juvenile offender who did not commit homicide.  A State need not guarantee the 
offender eventual release, but if it imposes a sentence of life it must provide him 
or her some realistic opportunity to obtain release before the end of that term.
108
 
In deciding challenges to sentencing practices under the Eighth Amendment, the Court 
applies a two-part test: it considers objective indicia—including both state legislation and 
sentencing practices, and it then brings its own judgment to bear on the issue.
109
  The question of 
objective indicia depends, by definition, on external factors.  Conversely, the notion that the Court 
must use its own judgment to determine whether a sentence conforms to the ―‗evolving standards 
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society‘‖
110
 has created the opening for the 
Court‘s unique treatment of juvenile offenders.
111
  We therefore focus on this second prong of the 
                                                          
Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. Fed. Commc‘ns Comm‘n, 518 U.S. 727, 743 (1996).  Similarly, the Court has upheld a 
state‘s right to restrict when a minor can work, guided by the premise that ―[t]he state‘s authority over children‘s activities 
is broader than over the actions of adults.‖  Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944).  The Court‘s school prayer 
cases similarly take into account the unique vulnerabilities of youth, and their particular susceptibility to coercion.  See 
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992) (observing that ―there are heightened concerns with protecting freedom of 
conscience from subtle coercive pressure in the elementary and secondary public schools.‖).  See also Santa Fe Indep. Sch. 
Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 311–12, 317 (2000). 
108 See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010). 
109 See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023 (―The analysis begins with objective indicia of national consensus.‖); id. 
at 2026 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 575) (―In accordance with the constitutional design, ‗the task of interpreting the 
Eighth Amendment remains our responsibility.‖).  The Court has long recognized the independent role it plays in 
evaluating sentences under the Eighth Amendment.  In Coker v Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977), where the Court held 
that a sentence of death was impermissible in cases of rape, the Court specifically acknowledged that the objective 
evidence, while important, did not ―wholly determine‖ the issue, ―for the Constitution contemplates that in the end our 
own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth 
Amendment.‖  See also Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982). 
Although the judgments of legislatures, juries, and prosecutors weigh heavily in the balance, it is for 
us ultimately to judge whether the Eighth Amendment permits imposition of the death penalty on 
one such as Enmund who aids and abets a felony in the course of which a murder is committed by 
others but who does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal 
force will be employed.  We have concluded, along with most legislatures and juries, that it does 
not. 
Id. 
110 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976)). 
111 In Roper, Justice Kennedy specifically noted the Court‘s ―rule‖ that ―‗the Constitution contemplates that 
in the end our own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the 
Eighth Amendment.‘‖  543 U.S. at 563 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002)) (internal quotations 
omitted).  Justice Kennedy wrote, ―Last, to the extent Stanford [v. Kentucky] was based on a rejection of the idea that this 
Court is required to bring its independent judgment to bear on the proportionality of the death penalty for a particular class 
of crimes or offenders, it suffices to note that this rejection was inconsistent with prior Eighth Amendment decisions.‖  
Roper, 543 U.S. at 574 (internal citations omitted).  See also Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2036 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 575) 
(internal citations omitted) (―Community consensus, while ‗entitled to great weight,‘ is not itself determinative of whether 
a punishment is cruel and unusual. . . . In accordance with the constitutional design, ‗the task of interpreting the Eighth 
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analysis to examine the Court‘s exercise of its own judgment, in light of evolving standards, 
regarding the constitutionality of a particular punishment. 
The Court‘s perception of proportionality is central to its judgment about whether a 
certain punishment is cruel and unusual.
112
  The Court in Graham explained that cases addressing 
the proportionality of sentences ―fall within two general classifications.  The first involves 
challenges to the length of term-of-years sentences given all the circumstances in a particular 
case.‖
113
  Under the first classification, the Court considers the circumstances of the case in its 
determination whether the sentence is ―unconstitutionally excessive.‖
114
  Justice Kennedy directs 
courts to first compare ―the gravity of the offense and the severity of the sentence.‖
115
  In the rare 
case where this ―‗threshold comparison . . . leads to an inference of gross disproportionality,‘ the 
court should then compare the defendant‘s sentence with the sentences received by other 
offenders in the same jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the same crime in other 
jurisdictions.‖
116
  If this comparative analysis ―‗validate[s] an initial judgment that [the] sentence 
is grossly disproportionate,‘ the sentence is cruel and unusual.‖
117
 
The second, ―categorical‖ classification of cases assesses the proportionality of a 
sentence as compared to the nature of the offense or the ―characteristics of the offender.‖
118
  In 
―categorical‖ cases, the Court may deem a particular sentence unconstitutional for an entire class 
                                                          
Amendment remains our responsibility.‖).  In Thompson v. Oklahoma, the Court, in exercising its independent judgment 
to determine whether the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders under the age of sixteen was 
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment, wrote, ―[W]e first ask whether the juvenile‘s culpability should be 
measured by the same standard as that of an adult, and then consider whether the application of the death penalty to this 
class of offenders ‗measurably contributes‘ to the social purposes that are served by the death penalty.‖  487 U.S. 815, 833 
(1988). 
112 As the Graham court wrote, ―Embodied in the Constitution‘s ban on cruel and unusual punishments is 
the ‗precept of justice that punishment for the crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.‖  130 S. Ct. at 
2021 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910)). 
113 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021. 
114 Id.  In Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), the Court invalidated under the Eighth Amendment a life 
without parole sentence imposed on an adult offender following his conviction for a seventh non-violent felony, passing a 
bad check.  This followed the Court‘s upholding a life with parole sentence imposed on an adult offender following the 
defendant‘s third conviction for a non-violent felony in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (defendant was convicted 
of obtaining money under false pretenses).  The Court distinguished Solem, noting that the defendant‘s sentence was ―far 
more severe than the life sentence we considered in Rummel v. Estelle,‖ since it gave the defendant no chance for parole.  
Solem, 463 U.S. at 297. 
After Solem, adult defendants have had difficulty sustaining a challenge to the proportionality of a term of years sentence 
under the Eighth Amendment.  In Harmelin v. Michigan, a closely divided Court upheld a life without parole sentence for 
possession of a large quality of cocaine.  The controlling opinion wrote that the Eighth Amendment contains a ―narrow 
proportionality principle‖ that ―does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence,‖ but instead ―forbids 
only extreme sentences that are ‗grossly disproportionate‘ to the crime.‖  501 U.S. 957, 997, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in judgment).  See also Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (upholding sentence of 
twenty-five years to life for the theft of a few golf clubs under California‘s ―Three Strikes Law‖); Lockyer v. Andrade, 
538 U.S. 63 (2003) (upholding sentence of life in prison for two convictions of petty theft under California‘s ―Three 
Strikes Law.‖). 
115 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022. 
116 Id. (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005). 
117 Id. (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005). 
118 Id. (emphasis added). 
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of offenders, due to shared characteristics that make them categorically less culpable than other 
offenders who commit similar or identical crimes.
119
  As part of this proportionality analysis, the 
Court has tied the legitimacy of any particular sentence to a determination of whether the sentence 
serves the acceptable purposes, or ―legitimate goals,‖ of punishment—retribution, deterrence, 
incapacitation, and rehabilitation.
120
  As demonstrated in Graham, a sentence disproportionate to 
the penological objectives it claims to serve will doom many adult sentences imposed on 
juveniles.  It is this second strand of the Court‘s proportionality analysis, focused on the 
characteristics of the offender, which invites a distinctive application of the Eighth Amendment to 
juveniles. 
As the Graham Court explained, ―a sentence lacking any legitimate penological 
justification is by its nature disproportionate to the offense‖ and therefore unconstitutional.
121
  
Relying on developmental and scientific research, the Graham Court held that none of the four 
accepted rationales for the imposition of criminal sanctions was served by imposing a life without 
parole sentence on a juvenile.
122
  The Court first rejected both retribution and deterrence as 
proffered rationales for the sentence, echoing its earlier holding in Roper that emphasized the 
reduced blameworthiness of juvenile offenders.
123
  It then rejected incapacitation as a justification 
for life without parole sentences, further underscoring the folly of making irrevocable judgments 
about youth: 
To justify life without parole on the assumption that the juvenile offender 
forever will be a danger to society requires the sentencer to make a judgment 
that the juvenile is incorrigible.  The characteristics of juveniles make that 
judgment questionable. . . . Even if the State‘s judgment that Graham was 
incorrigible were later corroborated by prison misbehavior or failure to mature, 
the sentence was still disproportionate because that judgment was made at the 
outset.  A life without parole sentence improperly denies the juvenile offender a 
chance to demonstrate growth and maturity.  Incapacitation cannot override all 
other considerations, lest the Eighth Amendment‘s rule against disproportionate 
sentences be a nullity.
124
 
The goal of rehabilitation was likewise rejected, as the Court found the punishment simply at odds 
with the rehabilitative ideal.
125
  The Court stated, ―By denying the defendant the right to reenter 
the community, the State makes an irrevocable judgment about that person‘s value and place in 
society‖—a judgment inconsistent with a juvenile non-homicide offender‘s ―capacity for change 
                                                          
119 Id.  For other instances of the Court applying this sort of categorical approach, see, e.g., Kennedy v. 
Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (applying the approach for defendants convicted of rape where the crime was not intended 
to and did not result in the victim‘s death); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (applying the approach to ban the 
death penalty for defendants who committed crimes before turning 18); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (applying 
the approach to ban the death penalty for defendants who are mentally retarded). 
120 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 2030. 
123 Id. at 2028–29. 
124 Id. at 2029. 
125 Id. at 2029–30. 
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and limited moral culpability.‖
126
 
In prohibiting the execution of juvenile offenders in Roper five years earlier, the Court 
expressly relied on many of the medical, psychological and sociological studies cited above, as 
well as common experience.  This evidence showed, and the majority held, that children under 
age eighteen are ―‗categorically less culpable‘‖ and more amenable to rehabilitation than adults 
who commit similar crimes.
127
  The Court reasoned that because juveniles have reduced 
culpability, they cannot be subjected to the harshest penalty reserved for the most depraved adult 
offenders; punishment for juveniles must be moderated to some degree to reflect their lesser 
blameworthiness.
128
 
As in Graham, the Roper Court stressed the incongruity of imposing a final and 
irrevocable penalty on an adolescent who had the capacity to change and grow.  ―From a moral 
standpoint it would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a 
greater possibility exists that a minor‘s character deficiencies will be reformed.‖
129
  The Court 
underscored that the State was not permitted to extinguish the juvenile‘s ―potential to attain a 
mature understanding of his own humanity.‖
130
  It noted that ―[t]he differences between juvenile 
and adult offenders are too marked and well understood to risk allowing a youthful person to 
receive‖ a sentence of life without parole for a non-homicide crime. 
131
  The Graham Court then 
expounded on this point: 
These salient characteristics mean that ‗[i]t is difficult even for expert 
psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime 
reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender 
whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.‘ Accordingly, ‗juvenile offenders 
cannot with reliability be classified among the worst offenders.‘  A juvenile is 
not absolved of responsibility for his actions, but his transgression ‗is not as 
morally reprehensible as that of an adult.‘‖
132
 
Like Roper, the Court adopted a categorical ban on life without parole sentences for juveniles 
convicted of non-homicide offenses.  Without a categorical rule, the Court noted that an 
―unacceptable likelihood exists that the brutality or cold-blooded nature of any particular crime 
would overpower mitigating arguments based on youth as a matter of course . . . .‖
133
  Were the 
Court to allow a case-by-case assessment of culpability, courts might not ―with sufficient 
accuracy distinguish the few incorrigible juvenile offenders from the many that have the capacity 
for change.‖
134
  Juvenile nonhomicide offenders are ―not sufficiently culpable to merit that 
punishment.‖
135
  The categorical rule ―gives all juvenile nonhomicide offenders a chance to 
                                                          
126 Id. at 2030. 
127 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 567 (2005) (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002)). 
128 Id. at 571. 
129 Id. at 570. 
130 Id. at 574. 
131 Id. at 572–73. 
132 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 573, 569; Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 
815, 835 (1988) (plurality opinion)). 
133 Roper, 543 U.S. at 573. 
134 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032. 
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demonstrate maturity and reform.‖
136
 
Justice Kennedy‘s opinion in Graham is an expansive statement about constitutional 
limits on the wholesale extension of adult sentencing policies and practices to juvenile offenders.  
Given the sharp differences between juvenile and adult offenders, rote application of adult 
sentences will fail to pass constitutional muster.  While the Court engaged in a routine Eighth 
Amendment analysis—considering objective indicia of national consensus but then applying its 
own independent judgment—it ultimately crafted a developmentally driven approach that 
broadened its prior case law that ―death is different‖
137
 under the Eighth Amendment to include a 
further guiding principle that ―kids are different.‖ 
Additionally, the Court‘s reluctance to impose adult sentences on juveniles derives from 
its growing belief that punishment for youth must be individualized.  The Court made clear that 
the juvenile must be given an opportunity to demonstrate the capacity to change—not only at the 
time of sentencing, but even over the course of time as he or she matures.  The Court explained: 
Even if the State‘s judgment that Graham was incorrigible were later 
corroborated by prison misbehavior or failure to mature, the sentence was still 
disproportionate because that judgment was made at the outset.  A life without 
parole sentence improperly denies the juvenile offender a chance to demonstrate 
growth and maturity.  Incapacitation cannot override all other considerations, 
lest the Eighth Amendment‘s rule against disproportionate sentences be a 
nullity.
138
 
Interestingly, this idea of individualized assessment is already embedded in the Court‘s capital 
jurisprudence.  The opportunity to show mitigation prior to the imposition of a sentence of death 
is central to the Court‘s case law assessing the constitutionality of various death penalty 
schemes.
139
 
This well-developed jurisprudence on mitigation in death penalty cases has been 
understood to apply because of the extraordinary nature of the punishment.  The Court has 
recognized that unique protections apply because ―death is a punishment different from all other 
sanctions in kind rather than degree.‖
140
  Graham, however, eliminated the ―death is different‖ 
adult sentencing distinction—at least when juveniles are involved.  This consequence of Graham 
was expressly noted by the dissent.
141
  Under Graham and Roper, sentences that would be deemed 
                                                          
135 Id. at 2030. 
136 Id. at 2032. 
137 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986). 
138 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029. 
139 The Court has held that, in adult death penalty cases, ―the fundamental respect for humanity underlying 
the Eighth Amendment requires that the defendant be able to present any relevant mitigating evidence that could justify a 
lesser sentence.‖  Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 85 (1987). The sentencer must consider all mitigating evidence and 
allow for individualized sentencing that hypothetically takes into account the full context in which the crime occurred.  See 
generally Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: The Paradox of Today‟s Arbitrary and Mandatory 
Capital Punishment Scheme, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 345 (1998) (arguing that the present capital sentencing scheme 
is paradoxical insofar as it is both arbitrary and mandatory). 
140 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303–04 (1976). 
141 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2046 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (―Today‘s decision eviscerates that distinction 
[between capital and noncapital sentencing].  ‗Death is different‘ no longer.‖). 
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appropriate for adult offenders would be unconstitutional for a child who committed like offenses.  
In the wake of these cases, courts should similarly look to mitigating factors that may justify a 
less harsh sentence whenever a child receives a sentence designed for an adult.
142
  To ensure that 
sentences for juveniles are not unconstitutionally disproportionate, courts should evaluate 
mitigating factors including the juvenile‘s age, level of involvement in the offense, external or 
coercive pressures surrounding the criminal conduct, and other relevant characteristics.  These 
factors should be considered in light of the juvenile‘s diminished capacity, increased impulsivity, 
and capacity for change or rehabilitation. 
As Justice Frankfurter wrote over fifty years ago in May v. Anderson,
143
 ―[c]hildren have 
a very special place in life which law should reflect.  Legal theories and their phrasing in other 
cases readily lead to fallacious reasoning if uncritically transferred to determination of a State‘s 
duty towards children.‖
144
  Today, adult sentencing practices that take no account of youth—
indeed permit no consideration of youth—are unconstitutionally disproportionate as applied to 
juveniles.  This approach builds upon recent Supreme Court jurisprudence that recognizes that 
juveniles who commit crimes—even serious or violent crimes—can outgrow this behavior and 
become responsible adults, and therefore courts cannot make judgments about their 
irredeemability at the outset.
145
 
B. A New Look at Juvenile Conditions of Confinement 
With the shift in focus from the constitutional procedural protections of the 1960s and 
1970s to the harsher penalties of the 1980s and 1990s, the constitutional analysis of juvenile 
conditions cases also changed.  The 1970s saw a spate of cases striking down juvenile conditions 
as unconstitutional, resting on the same premise as the juvenile court itself—juveniles deserved 
treatment and rehabilitation.
146
  The cases also recognized juveniles‘ unique vulnerability and the 
resulting trauma that harsh conditions could impose on them.
147
  More recently, however, courts 
have rarely struck down conditions as interfering with the right to treatment.
148
 
The reasoning of both Roper and Graham, however, may now create new opportunities 
in juvenile conditions cases.  The underlying recognition that youth are more vulnerable, more 
susceptible to outside pressures, and more capable of change than their adult counterparts 
suggests that courts may be more protective of incarcerated juveniles.  Harmful or deplorable 
                                                          
142 Because youth are categorically less culpable than adults, courts should always treat their youth as a 
mitigating factor that may justify a lesser sentence.  See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 553 (finding that youths‘ irresponsible 
conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult and that juveniles‘ own vulnerability and comparative lack of 
control over their immediate surroundings mean that they have a greater claim than adults to be forgiven for failing to 
escape negative influences in their whole environment).  Other mitigating factors that courts typically consider may also 
be affected by a youth‘s age, immaturity, and development. 
143 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953). 
144 Id. at 536 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
145 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010). 
146 For a thoughtful discussion of the history of juvenile conditions cases and a more detailed consideration 
of how the courts protected a right to treatment, see Holland & Mlyniec, supra note 23. 
147 See, e.g., Lollis v. N.Y. State Dep‘t of Soc. Servs., 322 F. Supp. 473, 482 (1970) (relying heavily on 
expert testimony that isolation would be uniquely damaging to an adolescent); see also Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 
357 (7th Cir. 1974). 
148 Holland & Mlyniec, supra note 23, at 1801–1812. 
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conditions, which have been found constitutional in cases involving adults, may therefore be 
unconstitutional when imposed on juveniles—both because the impact of the harm is more 
significant for juveniles, and because the expectation of treatment and rehabilitation is higher. 
1. Problems Facing Confined Youth 
Whether in juvenile or adult institutions, confined juveniles face harsh conditions.  One 
report, for example, identified maltreatment of youth in juvenile facilities in thirty-nine states, 
plus the District of Columbia since 1970, as evidenced by federal investigations, class-action 
lawsuits or authoritative reports.
149
  Juveniles in these states faced excessive use of isolation or 
restraints, systemic violence, and physical and sexual abuse.
150
  Moreover, such maltreatment has 
been documented in twenty-two states since 2000.
151
  These numbers may reflect significant 
under-reporting because youth have little access to counsel, members of the media, or other ways 
of having their stories heard—and because youth may often fear retaliation if they report abuse. 
In adult facilities, conditions may be even more dangerous for youth.  Youth confined 
with adults are more likely to be physically or sexually abused, and to commit suicide than those 
in juvenile facilities.
152
  In fact, suicide is the number one cause of death for juveniles in adult 
jails.
153
  Attempts by facilities‘ staff to protect youth—generally by placing youth in isolation or 
administrative segregation, can cause even further damage: 
An individual held in solitary confinement for 23 hours a day typically begins to 
lose his sense of reality, and becomes paranoid, anxious and despondent, all of 
which can exacerbate existing mental health conditions.  Given that many of the 
youth being held in adult jails have experienced some serious trauma in their 
lives or have undiagnosed or untreated mental illness, they are particularly 
vulnerable.
154
 
Moreover, even under similar conditions, and without increased risk of abuse, youth are uniquely 
vulnerable to the trauma of incarceration in poor conditions.  ―From a developmental perspective, 
. . . juveniles need to be with family members and are perhaps more vulnerable to emotional harm 
from incarceration than adults.‖
155
  The harsh, and even potentially fatal, conditions for youth in 
                                                          
149 RICHARD A. MENDEL, THE ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., NO PLACE FOR KIDS: THE CASE FOR REDUCING 
JUVENILE INCARCERATION 5–7 (2011). 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 5. 
152 Emily Ray, Comment, Waiver, Certification and Transfer of Juveniles to Adult Court: Limiting Juvenile 
Transfers in Texas, 13 SCHOLAR 317, 320 (2010). 
153 MARGARET NOONAN, U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, MORTALITY IN LOCAL JAILS, 2000-2007 9 (2010). 
154 Terry F. Hickey & Camilla Roberson, Pretrial Detention of Youth Prosecuted as Adults, 44-DEC MD. 
B.J. 44, 48 (2011). 
155 Margaret Beyer, Juvenile Detention to “Protect” Children from Neglect, 3 D.C. L. REV. 373, 373 (1995); 
see also N.G. v. Connecticut, 382 F.3d 225 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting that a strip search would be uniquely damaging to a 
juvenile, but upholding some of the strip searches at issue).  In her dissenting opinion, then Judge Sotomayor underscored 
the harm from such a search that would be ―demeaning, dehumanizing, undignified, humiliating, terrifying, unpleasant, 
embarrassing, [and] repulsive.‖  Id. at 239 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting in part) (quoting Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 
723 F.2d 1263, 1272 (7th Cir. 1983)). 
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both juvenile and adult facilities, and their unique vulnerability to harm, highlight the importance 
of the constitutional standard. 
2. The Adult Standard: A Tough Bar 
As applied to adult prisoners, the Supreme Court‘s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence 
calls for significant deference to prison officials.  In early cases, the Court applied the Eighth 
Amendment to address sentencing rather than prison conditions.  In 1910, for example, the 
Supreme Court held a sentence unconstitutional as applied to a defendant who had falsified 
documents regarding a small sum of money.
156
  The defendant had been sentenced to a minimum 
of twelve years of prison with hard labor, followed by voting disqualification, ongoing 
surveillance and restrictions on his residency after his release.,
157
  The Court, observing that the 
sentence was highly disproportionate to the crime, concluded that it violated the Eighth 
Amendment.
158
  Since then, the Court has established that certain sentences violate the Eighth 
Amendment—the denial of citizenship,
159
 the imposition of the death penalty without proper 
procedural protections,
160
 or, as discussed above, the imposition of the death penalty
161
 or life 
without parole to certain categories of less culpable individuals.
162
 
In 1976, petitioners in Estelle v. Gamble asked the Court to consider whether the Eighth 
Amendment protects prisoners from harsh prison conditions—in that case the provision of 
inadequate medical care—even when the initial sentence imposed was constitutional.
163
  The 
Court held that the Eighth Amendment did govern such behavior, concluding that ―deliberate 
indifference to serious medical needs‖ by prison staff could constitute the ―‗unnecessary wanton 
infliction of pain‘ proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.‖
164
  To hold to the contrary, the Court 
observed, would allow ―the infliction of . . . unnecessary suffering,‖ and would be ―inconsistent 
with contemporary standards of decency . . . .‖
165
  Ultimately, however, the Court held that the 
Eighth Amendment had not been violated when prison doctors prescribed painkillers and rest for 
the prisoner‘s back pain, but did not seek an x-ray or take other steps to identify and treat his pain.  
Although an x-ray might have revealed a more accurate diagnosis, the failure to provide one was, 
at most, cause for a malpractice claim and did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
166
  In 
Estelle, as a result, the Court established the possibility of Eighth Amendment claims for pure 
conditions cases, but also set a high bar for what would constitute such a violation.  The Court 
further solidified this approach in Rhodes v. Chapman, holding that the double celling of prisoners 
did not violate the Constitution.
167
  The Court concluded that, at most, double celling ―inflicts 
                                                          
156 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 382 (1910). 
157 Id. at 364. 
158 Id. at 382. 
159 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958) (plurality opinion). 
160 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 283 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
161 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005). 
162 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010). 
163 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
164 Id. at 104 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182–83 (1976) (plurality opinion)). 
165 Id. at 103. 
166 Id. at 106. 
167 Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347–48 (1981). 
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pain,‖ but concluded that it did not constitute the ―unnecessary or wanton‖ infliction of pain that 
violates the Eighth Amendment.
168
  ―[T]he Constitution,‖ the Court stated, ―does not mandate 
comfortable prisons.‖
169
  Thus, the prisoners‘ additional complaints regarding limited job and 
educational opportunities did not rise to the level of constitutional violations.
170
  Scholars have 
noted that Rhodes initiated a line of cases curtailing the use of the Eighth Amendment to 
challenge prison conditions.
171
  Indeed the Rhodes Court explicitly asserted that ―[t]o the extent 
that such conditions are restrictive or even harsh, they are part of the penalty that criminal 
offenders pay for their offenses against society.‖
172
 
In subsequent cases, the Court further defined the standard for Eighth Amendment 
conditions cases—and established a uniquely high burden on prisoners seeking relief through the 
Eighth Amendment.  In particular, the Court held that the Constitution was violated in conditions 
cases only if the prison official had a sufficiently culpable state of mind.
173
  In 1994, in Farmer v. 
Brennan, the Court clarified the precise level of intent prison officials must demonstrate to 
warrant liability under the Eighth Amendment.  Farmer involved a male-to-female transsexual 
prisoner‘s complaint that the prison had failed to protect her from assault by the male inmates 
with whom she was placed.
174
  The Court clarified that ―deliberate indifference‖ to the prisoner‘s 
need depended on both an objective and subjective component.
175
  The harm to the prisoner must 
be objectively sufficiently serious, denying a prisoner ―the minimal civilized measure of life‘s 
necessities . . . .‖
176
  It must also be based on the subjective state of mind of the prison official, 
which, Farmer clarified, must be more than mere negligence, though it could fall short of intent to 
harm.
177
  The Court concluded that liability under the Eighth Amendment would apply when a 
prison official ―knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official 
must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of 
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.‖
178
  Under this standard, ―[i]nmates 
have the difficult task of exposing the prison official‘s state of mind.‖
179
  Although not a complete 
bar to relief, this standard has imposed significant obstacles to establishing liability in adult prison 
conditions cases. 
                                                          
168 Id. at 348 (emphasis added). 
169 Id. at 349. 
170 Id. at 348. 
171 Holland & Mlyniec, supra note 23, at 1806. 
172 Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. 
173 Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991). 
174 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 829 (1994). 
175 Id. at 838. 
176 Id. at 834 (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347). 
177 Id. at 835. 
178 Id. at 837. 
179 Christine Rebman, Comment, The Eighth Amendment and Solitary Confinement: The Gap in Protection 
from Psychological Consequences, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 567, 602 (1999).  See also Higgins v. Corr. Med. Servs. of Ill., 178 
F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding that medical staff did not ―consciously disregard‖ the risk of harm when they failed to 
treat Plaintiff‘s dislocated shoulder—even though he had informed them that the shoulder had ―popped out of joint‖ and a 
nurse testified that it was hanging ―forward and lower than right‖).  The fact that the Plaintiff had not seemed to be in great 
pain convinced the court that the medical staff did not consciously disregard the risk. 
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As currently understood, the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments require only 
freedom from unnecessary restraint and minimally humane conditions of 
confinement.  Food, clothing, shelter and medical care must only be adequate 
enough to avoid harm.  In the main, treatment or training is directed at little 
more than preserving the peace within the training school. 
Moreover, to the extent that a violation of even these minimal standards occurs, 
federal judges are precluded from issuing sweeping corrective injunctions by 
the ―hands off‖ doctrine.  As early as 1974, the United States Supreme Court 
began to show great deference to prison administrators and to tell trial court 
judges to refrain from interfering with the day-to-day operations of prisons.
180
 
The trajectory of adult Eighth Amendment cases, as a result, has established a high bar for 
prisoners alleging unconstitutional conditions. 
In excessive use of force cases, deference to safety concerns makes the subjective 
standard even more stringent; the Court will not hold the behavior unconstitutional unless 
officials act ―maliciously and sadistically.‖
181
  In adult isolation cases, courts have also applied an 
extraordinarily high bar, holding, for example, that the mere infliction of ―psychological pain‖ 
does not rise to the level of constitutional harm.
182
  The recent Supreme Court case of Brown v. 
Plata, however, provides some hope for prisoners seeking redress through the Eighth 
Amendment.  Affirming the lower court‘s order that prisoners be released to prevent 
overcrowding, Plata held that the overcrowding was so severe that it led to the violation of 
prisoners‘ rights to medical and mental health care and safe conditions.
183
  Because overcrowding, 
rather than an individual correctional staff person‘s action, led to the conditions at issue, the Court 
did not touch upon the subjective inquiry.  Instead, the Court simply concluded that ―[j]ust as a 
prisoner may starve if not fed, he or she may suffer or die if not provided adequate medical care.  
A prison that deprives prisoners of basic sustenance, including adequate medical care, is 
incompatible with the concept of human dignity and has no place in civilized society.‖
184
  While 
this reasoning may be limited to overcrowding cases, it does open the door to arguments that 
focus on the effect on prisoners, rather than the intent of the officials.  Because the Court not only 
addressed medical care, but also made significant mention of the highly troubling situation in 
which mentally ill inmates were held in administrative segregation for months at a time, Plata 
also opens the door to applying this analysis to a broader array of conditions.
185
 
3. A New Juvenile Standard 
The adult standard, although evolving, is still not appropriate for juveniles.  As one 
scholar explained, 
                                                          
180 Holland & Mlyniec, supra note 23, at 1807. 
181 Substantive Rights Retained by Prisoners, 91 GEO. L.J. 887, 910 (2003). 
182 See, e.g., Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1263–64 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (recognizing, however, that 
isolation can violate the Eighth Amendment when it inflicts serious mental illness). 
183 Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1924–26 (2011). 
184 Id. at 1928. 
185 Id. at 1933; see also Erica Goode, Prisons Rethink Isolation, Saving Money, Lives & Sanity, N.Y TIMES, 
Mar. 10, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/11/us/rethinking-solitary-confinement.html?pagewanted=all. 
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The constitutional protection available to a child in detention should be more 
extensive than the protection against punishment applicable to an adult pre-trial 
detainee in a criminal case.  After all, the state‘s purpose is different.  The end 
result of a juvenile delinquency case is not simply punishment but, based upon 
state statute, some form of rehabilitation combined with protection of the 
public.  Furthermore, on a practical level children differ from adults.  Their 
needs are different.  The injuries that can befall them in detention are both 
different and greater than adults.  Public officials cannot rely upon the maturity 
of a child as they can an adult. 
186
 
The recognition in Roper and Graham that juveniles are categorically less mature in their 
decision-making capacity, more vulnerable to outside pressures including peer pressure, and have 
personalities that are more transitory and less fixed,
187
 underscores that courts cannot simply 
apply the adult constitutional standard to juveniles.  And, indeed, the Court has long explicitly 
recognized the need for tailoring the Constitutional analysis to youth, observing that ―[l]egal 
theories and their phrasing in other cases readily lead to fallacious reasoning i[f] uncritically 
transferred to determination of a state‘s duty toward children.‖
188
 
The Supreme Court has never squarely established the constitutional standard for 
juvenile conditions cases.
189
  The Court has clarified, however, that a less deferential Fourteenth 
Amendment standard applies in situations in which punishment is not the primary goal.
190
  For 
example, individuals confined for treatment purposes, such as those involuntarily confined to 
mental health facilities, ―are entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement 
than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish.‖
191
  Similarly, for adults 
in pre-trial detention not yet convicted of a crime, challenged conditions are unconstitutional 
under the Fourteenth Amendment if they amount to punishment.
192
 
Applying a similar analysis, the majority of jurisdictions have therefore applied the 
Fourteenth rather than the Eighth Amendment to juvenile conditions cases.
193
  This approach is 
further supported by the numerous Supreme Court cases applying a Fourteenth Amendment 
standard generally to challenged practices and policies of the juvenile justice system, in 
recognition of the system‘s uniquely rehabilitative and non-criminal nature.
194
 
                                                          
186 Michael J. Dale, Lawsuits and Public Policy: The Role of Litigation in Correcting Conditions in Juvenile 
Detention Centers, 32 U.S.F. L. REV. 675, 702 (1998). 
187 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2038 (2010) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70). 
188 May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
189 See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 669 (1977) (―We find . . . an inadequate basis for wrenching the 
Eighth Amendment from its historical context and extending it to traditional disciplinary practices in the public schools.‖). 
190 See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 314–25 (holding as erroneous instructions given to the 
jury that the proper standard of liability was that of the Eighth Amendment in a case regarding the substantive rights of 
involuntarily committed mentally retarded persons). 
191 Id. at 322. 
192 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). 
193 See, e.g., A.J. v. Kierst, 56 F.3d 849, 854 (8th Cir. 1995); Gary H. v. Hegstrom, 831 F.2d 1430, 1431–32 
(9th Cir. 1987); H.C. ex rel. Hewett v. Jarrard, 786 F.2d 1080, 1084–85 (11th Cir. 1986); Alexander S. v. Boyd, 876 F. 
Supp. 773, 795-96 (D. S.C. 1995). 
194 For example, in In re Gault, the Court applied the Fourteenth, rather than the Sixth Amendment to hold 
that juveniles have a right to counsel.  387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967) (quoting Powell v. State of Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1953)) 
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Under both the Fourteenth and the Eighth Amendment analysis, however, there remains 
a significant lack of clarity on precisely how juvenile conditions should be assessed.  For 
example, the Ninth Circuit has established that ―the more protective fourteenth amendment 
standard‖ applies to juvenile justice cases, at least when the goal of the jurisdiction‘s juvenile 
justice system is rehabilitative rather than punitive,
195
 but the court has not spelled out the 
contours of that right.  Without significant discussion as to the standards applied, the Seventh 
Circuit held in Nelson v. Heyne that juveniles‘ Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and 
unusual punishment was violated when they were beaten and involuntarily administered drugs, 
but that their Fourteenth Amendment due process right was violated by the failure to provide 
them with treatment.
196
  In contrast, the First Circuit has held that juveniles have no right to 
rehabilitation, but that their conditions of confinement must be analyzed under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
197
 
Whether under a Fourteenth or Eighth Amendment analysis, the standard for conditions 
cases applied to juveniles should be appropriately tailored to their developmental status, and not 
simply a reiteration of adult standards.  To incorporate developmental status into the existing 
structure for conditions claims, a juvenile deliberate indifference standard would require courts to 
consider: (1) the seriousness of the harm in light of juvenile vulnerability; and (2) the intent of the 
correctional official in light of the heightened duty to protect juveniles. 
Assessing the Seriousness of the Harm in Juvenile Cases 
In establishing a constitutional violation under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment, 
courts must initially consider the seriousness of the harm.
198
  In light of adolescent vulnerability, 
conditions may rise to this level in the juvenile context even when they do not for adults.  As 
described in Section I of this Article, and recognized by the Supreme Court in both Roper and 
Graham, juveniles are both more vulnerable to pressures and more malleable than adults.  This 
means that the effects of a harmful condition may take a unique toll on a juvenile, even when the 
same punishment is constitutional for an adult.  For example, such practices as isolation or strip-
searching may inflict heightened trauma on youth.  Similarly, the failure to provide education and 
rehabilitation may be particularly harmful to a juvenile by depriving him or her of the opportunity 
for age-appropriate growth and development.  Indeed, even before Roper, courts recognized that 
certain institutional conditions might be unconstitutional as applied to a juvenile even when they 
fall within constitutional bounds for an adult.
199
 
                                                          
(observing that juveniles have more need than adults for ―the guiding hand of counsel‖).  In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, the 
Court underscored that the Fourteenth rather than the Sixth Amendment governed the functioning of juvenile court.  403 
U.S. 528, 543 (1976) (holding that juveniles are not entitled to trial by jury).  Failing to distinguish between juvenile and 
adult court, the Supreme Court explained, ―chooses to ignore, it seems to us, every aspect of fairness, of concern, of 
sympathy, and of paternal attention that the juvenile court system contemplates.‖  Id. at 550.  In Schall v. Martin, the 
Supreme Court applied the Fourteenth Amendment to a challenge to juvenile pre-trial detention practices, emphasizing the 
importance of the State‘s ―‗parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child‘‖ 467 U.S. 253, 
263 (1984) (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982)). 
195 Gary H., 831 F.2d at 1432. 
196 Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 357, 360 (7th Cir. 1974). 
197 Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 1177, 1179 (1st Cir. 1983). 
198 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 878 (1994). 
199 A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Detention Ctr., 372 F.3d 572 
(3d Cir. 2004) (remanding to the lower court).  The Juvenile Law Center represented A.M. in this matter. 
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Since Roper and Graham, this argument carries even more weight.  Recently, the United 
States District Court for New Jersey explicitly recognized that juvenile status may impact the 
protections owed to incarcerated individuals, and that isolation of youth may be unconstitutional 
even if it would be constitutional for adults.
200
  This recognition of the unique harm to youth is 
consistent with developmental research on adolescent vulnerability, specifically in the areas of 
emotion regulation and independent functioning.
201
  Harsh penalties imposed on juveniles are 
likely to evoke a range of negative emotions (e.g., anger, fear, distress) that adolescents cannot 
effectively regulate, thereby leading to psychological distress and potentially psychopathology.
202
  
Further, this type of treatment could undermine adolescents‘ developing sense of self by evoking 
a sense of powerlessness and challenging their bodily integrity.  For youth who have experienced 
trauma, the vulnerability is even further magnified.
203
  Thus, the appropriate ―seriousness of the 
harm‖ test for juveniles must account for the unique juvenile vulnerability to harm in 
confinement. 
Assessing Official Intent in Juvenile Cases 
As described above, in adult cases the Court generally requires proof of the prison 
official‘s subjective intent to hold a prison condition unconstitutional: a finding that the prison 
official knew of or consciously disregarded an excessive risk of harm.  Even under this standard, 
liability should attach for juveniles when it would not for adults; it is not unreasonable to expect 
that juvenile corrections staff understand—or are at least aware of—juveniles‘ unique 
vulnerability to harm and that they act accordingly.
204
  Ultimately, however, the standard itself is 
inapt for juvenile offenders—an objective standard that imposes liability when the prison official 
disregards an obvious risk of harm better responds to adolescent developmental immaturity. 
205
  
This heightened standard, whether the objective test or the heightened subjective test, is supported 
by the Supreme Court‘s acknowledgement in Graham and Roper that the Constitution must 
protect youth from harm even when it would not do so for adults.
206
 
This approach is further supported by the literature on developmental immaturity.  
Adolescents‘ decision-making deficits, impulsivity, and overall vulnerability make them 
dependent on adults for rational decisions regarding their welfare.  More specifically, adolescents‘ 
                                                          
200 Troy D. v. Mickens, No. 10-2092, 2011 WL 3793920, at *12 (D.N.J. Aug. 25, 2011).  The court applied 
the same theory to the right to counsel at a parole hearing, noting that it may be needed to protect juveniles from harsh 
conditions.  Id. at *8.  The Juvenile Law Center currently represents Troy D., along with co-counsel Dechert LLP. 
201 See, e.g., Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 49, at 745. 
202 Elizabeth Thompson Gershoff, Corporal Punishment by Parents and Associated Child Behaviors and 
Experiences:  A Meta-Analytic and Theoretical Review, 128 PSYCHOL. BULL. 539, 542, 554 (2002). 
203 For a broad discussion of the role of trauma in juvenile vulnerability, see SANDRA BLOOM, CREATING 
SANCTUARY: TOWARDS THE EVOLUTION OF SANE SOCIETIES 25–33 (1997). 
204 While neither the Troy D. nor A.M. cases mentioned above, supra note 199–200, explicitly address this 
point, the issues they raise about treating juveniles differently from adults support such an interpretation. 
205 This test has been applied outside the prison context in Fourteenth Amendment cases.  See, e.g., Kennedy 
v. City of Ridgefield, 439 F.3d 1055, 1062 (9th Cir. 2006); Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005); 
Christiansen v. City of Tulsa, 332 F.3d 1270, 1281 (10th Cir. 2003); see also Kaucher v. Cnty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 
427–28 (3rd Cir. 2006) (recognizing that an objective deliberate indifference standard might apply under the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
206 See generally Graham v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
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limited independent functioning and weak self-concept suggests that they may be less able to 
identify risks to their development and to protect themselves.
207
  A heightened standard would 
appropriately protect youth from the risk of treatment that could harm youth and interfere with 
their development into healthy adults.  For youth in the juvenile rather than criminal justice 
system, the explicit purposes of treatment and rehabilitation further support the heightened 
standard.  To hold staff liable only if they consciously disregard a risk undermines the 
requirement implicit in a rehabilitative system that staff proactively engage youth. 
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW SUPPORTS DISTINCTIVE TREATMENT OF JUVENILE 
OFFENDERS 
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that international law informs the 
domestic law of the United States.
208
  Specifically, the Supreme Court has consistently looked to 
international law and practice to interpret the broad language of the Eighth Amendment‘s cruel 
and unusual punishment clause.  In 1958, the Court held that the Amendment ―must draw its 
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,‖
209
 
and went on to analyze the opinions of the ―civilized nations of the world.‖
210
  Since then, the 
Court has repeatedly found relevant to its Eighth Amendment analyses the laws, practices, and 
opinions of the world‘s countries, as well as the evolving attitudes of the global community as 
evidenced by international treaties and conventions.
211
 
Recently, the impact of international law on the Court‘s opinions has been particularly 
evident in its death penalty and juvenile sentencing cases.  In holding that the death penalty was 
unconstitutional for those with mental disabilities, the Court noted that, ―within the world 
community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded 
offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved.‖
212
  Three years later, in Roper v. Simmons, the Court 
held the death penalty unconstitutional for juveniles.  To support its holding, the Court cited to the 
United Nation‘s Convention on the Rights of the Child (which is ratified by every nation in the 
                                                          
207 See Kemp et al., supra note 45. 
208 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (―[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be 
ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending 
upon it are duly presented for their determination‖). 
209 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
210 Id. at 102. 
211 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576 (2003) (―[o]ther nations, too, have taken action 
consistent with an affirmation of the protected right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual conduct.‖); 
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 n.21 (2002) (―within the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for 
crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved.‖); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 
815, 830–31 (1988) (―[t]he conclusion that it would offend civilized standards of decency to execute a person who was 
less than 16 years old at the time of his or her offense is consistent with the views that have been expressed by respected 
professional organizations, by other nations that share our Anglo-American heritage, and by the leading members of the 
Western European community.‖); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796 n.22 (1982) (―the doctrine of felony murder has 
been abolished in England and India, severely restricted in Canada and a number of other Commonwealth countries, and is 
unknown in continental Europe.‖); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977) (―[i]t is thus not irrelevant here that 
out of 60 major nations in the world surveyed in 1965, only 3 retained the death penalty for rape where death did not 
ensue.‖). 
212 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 n.21. 
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world except the United States and Somalia), other ―significant international covenants,‖
213
 and 
the practices of specific countries as evidence of ―the overwhelming weight of international 
opinion against the juvenile death penalty.‖
214
  In the 2010 case Graham v. Florida, the Supreme 
Court reiterated the importance of international practice when it used the fact that the United 
States was the only nation to maintain the practice of sentencing juvenile offenders to life in 
prison for non-homicide offences as support for declaring the practice unconstitutional.
215
  In 
2012, the Court will consider the constitutionality of imposing a life sentence without parole on 
juveniles in a murder case.
216
  International law and practice overwhelmingly oppose this practice, 
which will prove instructive if the Court continues its recent trend of reliance on international 
opinion. 
A. International Law and Juvenile Sentencing 
International law provides further support for a new look at other juvenile sentencing 
issues.  Regarding the sentencing of youth in general, the Committee on the Rights of the Child, 
the oversight body of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, advocates for the proportionality 
of any disposition ―not only to the circumstances and the gravity of the offense,‖ but also to ―the 
age, lesser culpability, circumstances and needs of the child, as well as to the various and 
particularly long-term needs of the society.‖
217
  The Committee also reemphasizes that the 
detention or imprisonment of juveniles should only be used as a means of last resort.
218
  Many of 
the non-child-specific treaties also advocate for special protection of children in conflict with the 
law throughout the judicial process.
219
 
Further, many of the international treaties that the Supreme Court has relied on in the 
past specifically prohibit the imposition of a sentence of life without parole on juveniles.  In 
addition to reminding states of the child‘s need for ―special safeguards and care including 
appropriate legal protection,‖ the Convention on the Rights of the Child explicitly bans the 
imposition of imprisonment without possibility of release for offenses committed by those under 
eighteen.
220
  The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), part of the 
International Bill of Rights,
221
 recommends that governments consider age and desirability of 
                                                          
213 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 576 (2005). 
214 Id. at 578. 
215 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2011). 
216 See SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, ORDERS IN PENDING CASES (Nov. 7, 2011), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/110711zor.pdf (showing that Jackson v. Hobbs, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011) 
(No. 10-9647), and Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011) (No. 10-9646), have been granted certiorari and will be 
heard by the United States Supreme Court). For a discussion of the facts of Miller and Jackson, see supra note 41. 
217 Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 10 (2007): Children‟s Rights in Juvenile 
Justice, ¶ 71, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/10 (Apr. 25, 2007) [hereinafter CRC, General Comment 10]. 
218 Id. at ¶ 70. 
219 See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14, ¶ 4, opened for signature Dec. 19, 
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR] (specifying that procedures for juveniles 
should take account of their age and the desirability of promoting their rehabilitation). 
220 Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 37, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 
(entered into force Sept. 2, 1990) [hereinafter Convention on the Rights of the Child]. 
221 OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www2.ohch.org/ 
english/law/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2012). 
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rehabilitation when sentencing juveniles,
222
 and grants special protection to minors on account of 
their age.
223
  The Human Rights Committee, the body responsible for overseeing the 
implementation of the ICCPR, has stated in its observations of United States compliance with the 
treaty that ―the committee is of the view that sentencing children to life sentence without parole is 
of itself not in compliance with article 24(1) [the right to a child‘s measures of protection] of the 
Covenant.‖
224
  International practice is equally disapproving of the practice.  The United States is 
the only nation in the world that currently imposes life without parole sentences on juveniles.
225
  
Even in countries where the laws allowing the practice remain on the books, these sentences are 
not imposed.
226
 
The United States also has a legal obligation to enforce international treaties it has 
ratified that forbid harsh sentencing practices for youth.  The Supremacy Clause of the United 
States Constitution declares that treaties are ―the supreme Law of the Land,‖
227
 and by signing 
international treaties, all courts of the United States are bound to give effect to them.
228
  Even if 
an international agreement is not self-executing and does not have the effect of law without 
necessary implementation,
229
 the United States is still bound by international law to respect the 
―object and purpose‖
230
 of the treaty, pending implementation.  Thus, the United States is required 
to respect the provisions of treaties it has signed, and their enforcement bodies‘ interpretations of 
the treaties, with respect to life without parole sentences for juveniles.  The United States has 
ratified and must therefore honor the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR),
231
 the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD),
232
 
                                                          
222 ICCPR, supra note 219, at art. 14. 
223 Id. at art. 24. 
224 Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the 
Covenant: Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, ¶ 34, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev. 1 (Dec. 
18, 2006). 
225 Connie de la Vega & Michelle Leighton, Sentencing our Children to Die in Prison: Global Law and 
Practice, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 983, 985 (2008). 
226 Id. at 990. 
227 U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2. 
228 Restatement (Third) of The Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 115(1)-(2) (1986). 
229 Id. at § 111(3). 
230 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 18, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 
(entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) (recognizing the VCLT as jus cogens, a fundamental norm from which no derogation is 
permitted); Restatement (Third) of The Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 102 (1986).  The United States 
considers ―many of the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to constitute customary international 
law on the law of treaties.‖  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, http://www. 
state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2012). 
231 See ICCPR, supra note 219, at art. 14, ¶ 4 (―In the case of juvenile persons, the procedure shall be such 
as will take account of their age and the desirability of promoting their rehabilitation.‖); Id. at art. 24, ¶ 1 (―Every child 
shall have . . . the right to such measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor.‖).  In signing the treaty, the 
United States made significant reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights including ―[t]hat 
the United States considers itself bound by article 7 to the extent that ‗cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment‘ means the cruel and unusual treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eights and/or Fourteenth 
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States‖; and ―[t]he United States reserves the right, in exceptional 
circumstances, to treat juveniles as adults.‖  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA‘S RESERVATIONS TO THE ICCPR, THE 
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE PROJECT, http://www.internationaljusticeproject.org/juvICCPR.cfm (last visited Feb. 25, 2012).  
The Human Rights Committee, the ICCPR‘s enforcement body, has stated that it views these reservations as 
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and the Convention Against Torture (CAT),
233
 all of which support a prohibition against the use 
of harsh sentences for juveniles. 
The treaties‘ oversight bodies issue periodic reports on the United States‘ compliance 
with the articles of the treaties.  Like the Human Rights Committee, the Committee on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination has stated that the persistence of the 
sentencing of juveniles to life without parole is incompatible with the United States‘ obligations 
under the CERD in light of the sentencing practice‘s disproportionate impact on youth of color.
234
  
The Committee Against Torture also stated that life imprisonment of children ―could constitute 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.‖
235
 
International law and practice support sentences for juveniles that are proportional and 
mindful of the child‘s need for special safeguards and care and explicitly prohibit the imposition 
of life without parole sentences for juveniles. 
B. International Law and Juvenile Conditions 
Just as the Supreme Court has turned to international law in its decisions on questions of 
sentencing, it can, and should, do so for questions of conditions of confinement.  International law 
underscores the unique protections confined juveniles need under the law.  When contemplating 
treatment or punishment, Article 37 of the Convention of the Rights of the Child requires that 
every child deprived of his or her liberty ―be treated with humanity and respect for the inherent 
dignity of the human person, and in a manner which takes into account the needs of persons of his 
or her age.‖
236
  Moreover, international treaties and conventions make clear that children must be 
                                                          
―incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant.‖  Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted 
by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Comments of the Human Rights Committee: United States of America, 
¶ 279, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.50, (Oct. 3, 1995) [hereinafter CCPR Concluding Observations/Comments].  Notably, 
the United States also entered another reservation to the convention, which allowed the imposition of capital punishment 
―on any person . . . including such punishment for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age.‖  ICCPR, 
supra note 219, at art. 6, ¶ 5.  According to the Committee, this reservation also violated the object and purpose of the 
Covenant.  CCPR Concluding Observations/Comments, at ¶ 281.  The reservation was effectively voided by the Supreme 
Court‘s decision in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), which held that imposing the death penalty upon juveniles 
under the age of eighteen violates the Eight Amendment. 
232 See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art. 2(c), opened 
for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 5 I.L.M. 352 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969) (―Each State Party shall take 
effective measures to review governmental, national and local policies, and to amend, rescind or nullify any laws and 
regulations which have the effect of creating or perpetuating racial discrimination wherever it exists.‖); Id. at art. 5(a) 
(―States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the right of 
everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in . . . [t]he 
right to equal treatment before the tribunals and all other organs administering justice.‖). 
233 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 
1984, 165 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June 26, 1987). 
234 Comm. On the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States 
Parties Under Article 9 of the Convention, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination: United States of America, ¶ 21, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/USA/CO/b (Feb. 2008). 
235 Comm. Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 19 of the 
Convention, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee Against Torture: United States of America, ¶ 34, U.N. 
Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (July 25, 2006). 
236 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 220, at art. 37. 
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treated differently than adults: the law specifically addresses children,
237
 promotes the best 
interest of children,
238
 and emphasizes the need to treat confined children differently from adults 
due to their age and future potential for rehabilitation and reintegration into society.
239
  Notably, 
the United Nations Rules for Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty (JDLs), passed by resolution of 
the U.N. General Assembly in 1990, establish detailed ―minimum standards‖
240
 for the protection 
of confined juveniles ―with a view to counteracting the detrimental effects of all types of 
detention and to fostering integration in society.‖
241
  These standards provide a good conceptual 
framework through which to view the special requirements necessary for juveniles in detention.  
International law standards also provide insights into some of the specific conditions youth face in 
confinement. 
International law establishes that youth should be separated from adults and should be 
housed in conditions that best meet their needs.  Article 37 of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC) explicitly requires that ―every child deprived of liberty shall be separated from 
adults unless it is considered in the child‘s best interest not to do so,‖ an obligation echoed 
throughout child-specific human rights instruments.
242
  General Comment Number 10, issued by 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child‘s oversight body, the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child, further elaborated on the language of the Convention, stating that children who turn 
eighteen do not have to be immediately moved to an adult facility and should be allowed to 
remain in a children‘s facility if it serves the child‘s best interest.
243
  Moreover, the JDLs provide 
a general guideline that reemphasizes the protection of children: ―[t]he principle criterion for the 
separation of the different categories of juveniles . . . should be the provision of the best type of 
care best suited to the particular needs of the individuals concerned and the protection of their 
physical, mental and moral integrity and well-being.‖
244
 
In contemplating the environment of the confined juvenile, international human rights 
conventions focus on the rehabilitative and developmental aims of detention.  For example, the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child requires that children are provided with ―a physical 
environment and accommodations which are in keeping with the rehabilitative aims of residential 
placement.‖
245
  The Convention on the Rights of the Child reaffirms the child‘s right to privacy 
for children who are alleged or accused to have infringed the penal law.
246
  The JDLs stress that 
                                                          
237 This analysis focuses on: the CRC, General Comment 10, supra note 217, issued by the Committee on 
the Rights of the Child; the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty (JDLs), G.A. 
Res. 45/113, Annex, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 49A, U.N. Doc. A/45/49/Annex (Dec. 14, 1990) [hereinafter 
JDLs]; and the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (The Beijing Rules), 
G.A. Res. 40/33, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 53, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/33 (Nov. 29, 1985) [hereinafter ―The 
Beijing Rules‖]. 
238 See, e.g., Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 220, at art. 3. 
239 See, e.g., JDLs, supra note 237, at ¶ 3; CRC, General Comment 10, supra note 217, at ¶ 85. 
240 JDLs, supra note 237, at ¶ 3. 
241 Id. 
242 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 220, at art. 37; see also JDLs, supra note 237, at ¶ 29 
(―In all detention facilities juveniles should be separated from adults, unless they are members of the same family.‖); The 
Beijing Rules, supra note 237, at ¶ 26.3 (―Juveniles in institutions shall be kept separate from adults . . . ―). 
243 CRC, General Comment 10, supra note 217, ¶ 86. 
244 JDLs, supra note 237, at ¶ 28. 
245 CRC, General Comment 10, supra note 217, at ¶ 89. 
246 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 220, at art. 40(2)(vii). 
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the ―possession of personal effects is a basic element of the right to privacy and [is] essential to 
the psychological well-being of the juvenile.‖
247
 
International law also requires medical and mental health treatment for juveniles to 
support their reintegration into society.  In addition to general provisions that guarantee access to 
adequate medical care for juveniles upon admission to facilities and throughout their stay,
248
 the 
JDLs specify that juveniles must receive both preventative and remedial care, as well as the 
medical services required to ―detect and . . . treat any physical or mental illness, substance abuse 
or other condition that may hinder the integration of the juvenile into society.‖
249
 
The importance of family contact for confined juveniles is also explicitly recognized in 
international law.  Article 37 establishes the child‘s ―right to maintain contact with his or her 
family through correspondence and visits, save in exceptional circumstances.‖
250
  The Committee 
on the Rights of the Child specifies ―[e]xceptional circumstances that may limit this contact [with 
the family] should be clearly described in the law and not be left to the discretion of the 
competent authorities.‖
251
  The JDLs require that detention facilities for juveniles be decentralized 
and be an appropriate size to facilitate access and contact between the juveniles and their families, 
at least once a week, but not less than once a month, because communication is ―an integral part 
of the right to fair and humane treatment and is essential to the preparation of juveniles for their 
return to society.‖
252
 
The Committee on the Rights of the Child is very specific on the use of restraints or 
force for juveniles.  Restraint or force may only be used when the child poses an imminent threat 
of injury to him or herself or others,
253
 when all other means have been exhausted,
254
 and under 
close and direct control of a medical and/or psychological professional.
255
  Restraints or force may 
never be used as a means of punishment.
256  
The Committee on the Rights of the Child specifies 
that corporal punishment, placement in a dark cell, closed or solitary confinement, or ―any other 
punishment that may compromise the physical or mental health or well-being of the child 
concerned‖ are strictly forbidden under Article 37.
257
 
One of the few standards specifically addressing safety issues for staff states that ―[t]he 
carrying and use of weapons by personnel should be prohibited in any facility where juveniles are 
detained.‖
258 
 This area is less developed in child-specific international human rights instruments, 
                                                          
247 JDLs, supra note 237, at ¶ 35. 
248 See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 220, at art. 25 (recognizing the right of a child to 
―treatment of his or her physical or mental health‖); CRC, General Comment 10, supra note 217, at ¶ 89 (providing that 
every child ―shall receive adequate medical care throughout his/her stay in the facility . . .‖). 
249 JDLs, supra note 237, at ¶ 51. 
250 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 220, at art. 37. 
251 CRC, General Comment 10, supra note 217, at ¶ 87. 
252 JDLs, supra note 237, at ¶¶ 58–60. 
253 CRC, General Comment 10, supra note 217, at ¶ 87; see also JDLs, supra note 237, at ¶¶ 65–67 
(prohibiting all disciplinary measures that constitute ―cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment . . . including corporal 
punishment‖). 
254 CRC, General Comment 10, supra note 217, at ¶ 89. 
255 Id. 
256 Id. 
257 Id. 
258 JDLs, supra note 237, at ¶ 65. 
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which tend to focus on the interests of the child, but an underlying theme seems to be that the best 
interests of the confined child carry particular weight.  When many children are housed together, 
their interests should be balanced against the best interests of other youth.For example, children 
should be kept in a juvenile facility past the age of eighteen if such a decision is ―not contrary to 
the best interests of the younger children in the facility.‖
259
  Likewise, the use of restraint or force 
on a juvenile is only justified when the child poses an imminent threat to him or herself or 
others.
260
  Consideration of the child‘s inherent dignity and the special needs of his or her age are 
always relevant.
261 
Human rights instruments place great importance on ensuring that institutional staff is 
aware of the special condition of juveniles.  They require staff to know about relevant national 
and international legal standards related to the juvenile‘s confinement, including the causes of 
juvenile delinquency, adolescent development information, and strategies for dealing with 
children in conflict without having to resort to judicial proceedings.
262
  The JDLs specify that 
personnel should attend ―courses of in-service training, to be organized at suitable intervals 
throughout their career.‖
263
  The Beijing Rules also emphasize that there is a ―necessary 
professional competence‖ when ―dealing with juvenile cases,‖ which should be established and 
maintained.
264
 
Human rights instruments extend beyond protecting children from harm; they also 
address the child‘s rehabilitative needs.  Indeed, they recognize education for every child of 
compulsory school age as critical to the child‘s development and eventual return to society after 
release.
265
  Education should be suited to the individual child‘s needs and abilities, and he or she 
should also be given vocational training in occupations that are likely to prepare him or her for 
future employment.
266
  The JDLs go further by stating that education for children in detention 
should be integrated with the education system of the country so that reintegration is simpler after 
release.
267
  The JDLs also specify that juveniles should be given the opportunity to perform 
remunerated labor.
268
  Additionally, juveniles with learning difficulties have a right to a special 
education.
269
  The instruments also specify that the juveniles have the right to a suitable amount of 
time for exercise and appropriate recreation.
270
 
International human rights standards provide clear support for a unique Eighth 
Amendment juvenile standard in conditions of confinement cases.  By highlighting the need for 
reintegration, rehabilitation, and the support of human dignity, and by articulating juveniles‘ 
                                                          
259 CRC, General Comment 10, supra note 217, at ¶ 86. 
260 Id. at ¶ 89. 
261 See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 220, at art. 37 (stating that ―[e]very child deprived 
of liberty shall be treated with humanity and respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, and in a manner which 
takes into account the needs of persons of his or her age.‖). 
262 CRC, General Comment 10, supra note 217, at ¶ 97. 
263 JDLs, supra note 237, at ¶ 85. 
264 The Beijing Rules, supra note 237, at Rule 22.1. 
265 JDLs, supra note 237, at ¶ 38; CRC, General Comment 10, supra note 217, at ¶ 89. 
266 CRC, General Comment 10, supra note 217, at ¶ 89. 
267 JDLs, supra note 237, at ¶ 38. 
268 Id. at ¶ 45. 
269 Id. at ¶ 38. 
270 Id. at ¶ 47; CRC, General Comment 10, supra note 217, at ¶ 89. 
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unique needs as they relate to conditions of confinement, international law clarifies the need for a 
more protective Eighth Amendment jurisprudence for juveniles. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Kids are different.  As Justice Sotomayor wrote in J.D.B v North Carolina, a child‘s age 
―is a fact ‗that generates commonsense conclusions about behavior and perception.‘‖
271
  Noting 
the long history of legal distinctions between children and adults, Justice Sotomayor further 
observed: ―Like this Court‘s own generalizations, the legal disqualifications placed on children as 
a class . . . exhibit the settled understanding that the differentiating characteristics of youth are 
universal.‖
272
  How we sentence and punish children must yield to these differences.  And while 
the Court has historically taken note of juvenile status in a broad array of civil and criminal 
contexts,
273
 the Court‘s most recent decisions in Roper, Graham, and J.D.B. chart a course for a 
more pronounced doctrinal shift in our analysis of children‘s rights under the Constitution.  The 
most severe sentences for children have been struck down, but the banning of these sentences 
raises larger questions about the constitutionality of any sentencing scheme that fails to take 
account of the commonsense differences between children and adults—differences confirmed by 
research.  ―The literature confirms what experience bears out.‖
274
 
These differences also cannot be ignored when evaluating the conditions under which 
children are incarcerated.  While the Constitution may tolerate the solitary confinement of adult 
inmates, for example, the isolation of children for weeks or months at a time recalls a Dickensian 
nightmare, which offends our evolving standard of decency and human dignity.  Children‘s 
unique needs for educational services, physical and behavioral health services, and appropriate 
interactions with nurturing caregivers to ensure their healthy development raise special 
challenges—but also place special obligations on those responsible for their confinement.  As 
recent Supreme Court case law has shown, children warrant unique protections under the 
Constitution.  Both the sentences they receive, and the conditions under which they serve those 
sentences, must be tailored to their developmental status. 
 
                                                          
271 J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2403 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 
674 (Breyer, J., dissenting)). 
272 Id. at 2403–04. 
273 See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
274 J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2403 n.5. 
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